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Abstract 
Expeditionary Air Force Civil Engineer support to recent operations in southwest 
Asia created a unique organizational learning environment, particularly related 
supporting the general engineering requirements of geographically separated units in a 
manpower-constrained contingency environment. One of the direct results of this 
organizational learning was the hub-and-spoke expeditionary engineer unit featuring 
elements of both Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, 
Engineer and Prime Base Emergency Engineer Force capabilities operating with theater-
wide visibility of infrastructure requirements. This study acquired insights from literature 
and a purposeful sample of subject matter experts about operational advantages this hub-
and-spoke unit offered compared to those offered by strictly legacy organizational 
models. The research used a Delphi method of expert opinion elicitation to which of 
these may be applicable in future contingency environments with caveats, constraints, 
and conditions that CE force planners should consider for hub-and-spoke organizations. 
The expert panel demonstrated consensus on 20 advantages and associated success 
factors, including resource cross-leveling flexibility, optimized organizational proximity 
to key support functions like logistics and contracting, centralized core engineering 
functions, and better-defined command relationships in the Joint environment. 
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 1 
AN ANALYSIS OF FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE SUCCESS OF 
EXPEDITIONARY CIVIL ENGINEER HUB-AND-SPOKE ORGANIZATIONS 
 I. Introduction 
Background 
Since the 1960s, expeditionary Air Force civil engineer (CE) capabilities have 
been presented to combatant commanders (COCOMs) primarily in the form of Prime 
Base Emergency Engineer Force (BEEF) and Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy 
Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer (RED HORSE) teams (Marlin, 1987). While 
these teams are operationally controlled by various levels of an often complex command 
structure, local wing commanders have developed an expectation that at least one of these 
teams will be assigned to their installation to support their local mission.  
Most recently, the Expeditionary Prime BEEF Group (EPBG), Expeditionary 
RED HORSE Group (ERHG), and Expeditionary Civil Engineer Group (ECEG) 
concepts have been utilized in Air Force Central Command’s (AFCENT) area of 
responsibility (AOR) in Southwest Asia (SWA) to present expeditionary CE capability to 
supported operations. These units use a hub-and-spoke concept of operation (CONOP) to 
fulfill roles and responsibilities related to general contingency engineering. They 
primarily support project programming, design, troop labor, and contract construction 
management needs generated by Air Force and Joint tactical infrastructure requirements 
(Allen, 2009). This CONOP has become the basis for presenting Air Force CE 
contingency support capabilities to commanders in the Joint operational community 
prosecuting Operations IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). 
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The operational advantages this CONOP appears to offer to supported commanders have 
led CE planners to consider its use in contingency situations in other areas of 
responsibility (AORs). 
One of the critical factors for success in most military operations is effectively 
addressing the challenge of applying the right people to the right place at the right time 
(Borofsky & Matecko, 1989). To address this challenge, CE force planners have 
primarily utilized two models to develop recommendations for how many and in what 
skills mix CE personnel will be required to support a given operation. For the first model, 
the Air Force personnel resources functional community maintains the Air Force 
Manpower Standard, which is based on expected personnel requirements at a permanent, 
enduring operating location. The Air Force Civil Engineer Unit Type Code (UTC) Guide 
and CE supplement to the War Mobilization Plan (WMP) form the second model. They 
are based on how many personnel may be required to fulfill Air Force infrastructure 
requirements in an expeditionary environment. The application of these two models in 
the situations for which they were developed has historically produced effective 
recommendations for manning levels (Winkler, 2011). 
These models assume that Prime BEEF expeditionary CE capabilities remain 
primarily aligned with and controlled by local installation commanders. This paradigm 
stands in contrast to the one in which hub-and-spoke organized Air Force CE units found 
themselves operating in later phases of OEF and OIF. These units were aligned at the 
command echelon above wing (or Joint equivalent), often as part of a Joint task force, 
with AOR-wide visibility of infrastructure requirements. As of 2013, they featured Prime 
BEEF capabilities and the heavy repair and construction capabilities of RED HORSE 
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under one centralized command element. Anecdotal accounts and those summarized in 
available after action reports (AARs) suggest that this alignment made it possible to 
better manage the utilization of expeditionary CE capability in the AFCENT AOR by 
enabling functional commanders to allocate often-limited CE resources to the areas 
where these resources will have the greatest impact on the mission. 
This research effort supports the CE contingency force planning community, who 
is seeking to develop a CE force planning model that capitalizes on operational 
advantages SWA hub-and-spoke CE units have appeared to offer supported commanders. 
Developing this model requires documenting current CE manpower planning knowledge 
developed in the course of applying the hub-and-spoke organizational model to CE units 
operating in SWA. Recommendations can then be made for application of appropriate 
facets of that knowledge to future operations plans in other AORs. Currently, only an ad 
hoc hub-and-spoke manpower model exists. It is limited in its ability to reflect human 
resources requirements for constructing, repairing, and maintaining expeditionary 
airfields. This research seeks to add to the existing force planning body of knowledge. Its 
outcome may act as the theoretical basis upon which further investigative efforts 
pertaining to contingency construction labor productivity, manpower planning tools, 
expeditionary airbase location optimization, knowledge transfer at deployment rotation 
turnover, exercises and evaluations, and others may be based.  
 
Research Objective 
This research's objective is to acquire insights and recommendations from 
literature and CE functional subject matter experts (SMEs) about factors that influence 
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CE hub-and-spoke units' successful delivery of operational advantages to supported 
commanders compared to those offered by strictly legacy expeditionary CE 
organizational models. It seeks to answer a research question formulated based on 
direction from the sponsor, previous research, published literature, and accounts of recent 
actions in OEF and OIF. Specifically: 
What are factors that influence successful delivery of operational 
advantages offered by hub-and-spoke organized expeditionary CE units? 
Answering this question requires the consideration of a series of initial investigative 
questions: 
1. What operational advantages have hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE 
units offered for meeting theater-level objectives effectively in SWA?  
2. Of the operational advantages determined in Question One, which might be 
potentially relevant or applicable to supporting the combined forces air 
component commander (CFACC) in another AOR? 
3. Of the operational advantages determined in Question One, which might not be 
potentially relevant or applicable to supporting the CFACC in another AOR? 
4. What factors should be present for CE hub-and-spoke units to successfully 
provide these operational advantages to a supported CFACC? 
Air Force senior leadership responses to the need to codify the organizational learning the 
CE community has experienced in recent SWA operations, commander-in-chief-directed 
reevaluation of the national security strategy in the Pacific, and actual and anticipated 
personnel resource constraints serve as the impetus for this research objective. It seeks to 
codify the organizational knowledge gained through the course of hub-and-spoke 
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operations in SWA and offer recommendations about how this knowledge may be 
applied to how expeditionary CE capability is employed in other contexts.  It is upon that 
basis that future research may be undertaken to develop tools that may more directly 
assist CE expeditionary manpower planners. 
Methodology 
Based on a grounded theory approach, two phases of analysis were used to meet 
the research objective.  The first phase of analysis documented existing policies on agile 
combat support (ACS) force planning, organizational learning and innovation, 
Department of Defense (DoD) planning guidance, and available AARs of expeditionary 
CE actions in SWA. The goal of this historical analysis phase was to compile current 
theories supporting the two models currently used in expeditionary CE force planning. 
Gaps in published organizational knowledge were then identified so qualitative data 
gathering in the second phase could be appropriately focused. 
The second phase of the research more closely examined identified gaps in 
published force hub-and-spoke force planning knowledge. This phase utilized a modified 
Delphi technique to elicit expert panel opinion. Panelists were queried on their opinions 
regarding the operational advantages obtained by organizing expeditionary CE capability 
in a hub-and-spoke fashion in SWA. The panel of experts' responses were iterated among 
the group to work towards agreement and consensus on an appropriate set of factors 
contributing to the success of CE hub-and-spoke units operating in SWA and their 
perceived applicability to other theaters. The goal of this phase was to document tacit 
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force planning knowledge and establish a theoretical basis upon which future research 
can be founded. 
 
Scope, Assumptions, and Limitations 
This research effort analyzed contingency CE force planning theories in the 
context of recent SWA deployment experiences. It sought to determine factors that made 
CE hub-and-spoke successful in SWA and which of them may be applicable to CE hub-
and-spoke units supporting Air Force expeditionary infrastructure requirements in other 
AORs. During the course of this research effort, assumptions were required to maintain 
appropriate scope and increase the likelihood that meaningful results were produced. 
Specifically, the research was based on the following general assumptions: 
 The material contained in AARs was communicated accurately and provided a 
comprehensive overview of the challenges met and issues addressed by CE hub-
and-spoke-organized units 
 Supported operational commanders in contingency environments will comply 
with published Air Force installation infrastructure standards and guidance 
 That expeditionary CE capabilities will be primarily organized, trained, equipped, 
and employed in support of CFACC requirements, with support provided to Joint 
infrastructure requirements by exception 
As with all expert opinion elicitations, data sourced from human recollection and 
communication comes with some bias that cannot be entirely eliminated through 
deliberate mitigation measures. Furthermore, potentially available data and informed 
opinion pertain to hub-and-spoke operations in SWA almost exclusively. An element of 
risk is introduced when attempting to generalize information to new contexts. Other 
AORs may introduce conditions or constraints that limit the potential success factors 
documented by this research and forecasted to be applicable elsewhere. The project was 
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also limited by the availability of adequate quantitative data to identify and validate other 
planning factors to be included in its recommendations.  
A formative effort, this research was not without limitations. Data classification, 
availability, method of elicitation and analysis, and time constraints presented the greatest 
limitations to this research. Only unclassified data were examined in the course of this 
study. While additional insight may be gained if classified data is incorporated into 
subsequent research efforts, these data would not have necessarily enhanced the utility of 
findings at such an early stage of this research stream. Thus, this research explored 
general operational advantages and associated unclassified success factors exclusively.  
While genuinely well-intentioned and having the prerequisite buy-in required for 
participation in the project, one of the primary sources of data - the SME panel - 
experienced ongoing challenges related to its collective ability to conform to the study's 
time constraints. Furthermore, applying the Delphi technique to the problem introduced 
its own constraints. Literature suggests that for as many projects that have achieved 
success conducting a Delphi study, there may be as many that have experienced 
unfavorable outcomes.  Common reasons for failure often include a combination of the 
following (Linstone & Turoff, 2002): 
 Imposing monitor views and preconceptions of a problem upon the respondent 
group by over-specifying the structure of the Delphi and not allowing for 
contribution of other perspectives related to the problem.  
 Assuming that Delphi can be a surrogate for all other human communications in a 
given situation.  
 Poor techniques of summarizing and presenting the group response and ensuring 
common interpretations of the evaluation scales utilized in the exercise.  
 Ignoring and not exploring disagreement so that discouraged dissenters drop out 
and an artificial consensus is generated  
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 Understanding the demanding nature of a Delphi and the fact that the respondents 
should be recognized as consultants and properly compensated for their time if the 
Delphi is not an integral part of their job function 
Literature suggests three additional limitations commonly associated with research using 
the Delphi technique to forecast solutions.  First, the data produced from a Delphi study 
is exclusively qualitative, not evidence-based.  Second, there are no universally 
recognized standards and guidelines for organizing and conducting a Delphi study 
(Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2005). Myriad opinions exist for how to identify panel 
members, how many should be utilized given a population, how many phases of 
questioning to conduct, the appropriate definition of consensus, how data should be 
analyzed and reported, and indicators for appropriate conclusion of a study (Hsu & 
Sandford, 2007; Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2005). Internal peer review of appropriate 
panel members and consultation with local statistical SMEs was accomplished to address 
potential validity concerns introduced by using descriptive statistical techniques. 
External time factors introduced the ultimate constraint on how thorough an 
investigation could be accomplished. These time factors confirm the third primary 
limitation: conducting a Delphi study can be time-consuming.  Appropriate time must be 
allotted to accomplish initial interviews and design, distribute, collect, analyze, and 
record questionnaires.  Literature-recommended times to allocate for Delphi studies vary 
from 45 days to 16 months (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975; Keeney, Hasson, 
& McKenna, 2005; Linstone & Turoff, 2002). While studies can be well planned and 
executed, researchers often underestimate the amount of time it takes to gain consensus 
(Keeney, Hasson, & McKenna, 2005). Lack of panel participation often requires follow-
up contact by way of reminder e-mails and phone calls, thus adding to the overall time 
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required. Data gathering in this research effort was attempted over major holiday seasons, 
through rigorous class schedules, and at a time when the sample population was task 
saturated planning courses of action to address unprecedented federal fiscal challenges. 
Subsequent phases of follow-up questions or further research on the themes suggested by 
this study may be best left to future researchers. 
The body of Delphi literature acknowledges the fact that Delphi studies typically 
possess limited internal validity (Lynch, 2012). To counter this limitation, Delphi studies 
are by their nature designed to utilize the concept of data triangulation inherent in 
grounded theory approaches to obtain inputs from multiple sources with the expectation 
of convergence. The tendency toward limited internal validity was addressed by 
intentionally designing the SME panel such that a representative group of opinions would 
be represented. Special consideration was also given to providing an adequate description 
of the intended outcomes of the research to the participants and using research colleagues 
to provide survey feedback. 
Despite its relative advantages, utilizing a Likert scale to gauge a subjects' level of 
agreement with given statements introduces potential limitations. Use of the scale to 
gauge a respondent's level of agreement with a statement assumes that respondents' 
responses refer wholly to the attitude being measured. Participants may agree or disagree 
with a given statement for a host of reasons beside the attitude of interest. However, this 
research determined that given the formative nature of this topic, the potential advantages 
the Likert scale offered outweighed its potential pitfalls, thus making its use most 
appropriate. 
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Expert assessments of current and future scenarios are not always free of potential 
bias or perfectly objective. Only agile combat support (ACS) SME opinion was solicited 
regarding how to replicate the operational advantages that past and present hub-and-
spoke expeditionary CE units offered to a supported CFACC. Supported commanders 
whose missions have the potential to be supported by CE capability organized in a hub-
and-spoke fashion were not canvassed. Thus, an assumption of this research is that the 
sample surveyed possess the knowledge required to accurately determine the general 
engineering effects required to effectively support a given operation. The validity and 
future applicability of this research effort's findings relies on open and honest 
communication with supported stakeholders about synchronizing perceived requirements 
and resource realities. 
Document Preview 
This document presents this research effort in 5 main topics: literature review, 
research methodology, results, and conclusions. Chapter II presents a historical analysis 
and review of relevant literature including a brief history of Air Force CE capability 
utilization; a review of the problem and its evolution, statutory guidance, and constraints; 
discussion of the importance of knowledge management in high-performing 
organizations, and a case for the use of an adapted Delphi technique to elicit expert 
opinion. Chapter III presents the methodology used to meet the research objectives. 
Chapter IV discusses results and associated analysis used to arrive at them. Chapter V 
rounds out the main portion of the document by presenting conclusions and 
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recommendations. Appendices are included to provide additional supporting information 
and document information sources.  
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II. Literature Review 
This historical analysis and literature review establishes the basis for how Air 
Force civil engineer (CE) capabilities interface with the Air Force’s doctrinal core 
function of agile combat support (ACS). In doing so, gaps in published Air Force CE-
related force planning knowledge are outlined to provide a basis for the execution of the 
research methodology presented in Chapter III. To more fully appreciate the force 
planning challenge Air Force CE faces as it prepares to support future operations, the 
research must discuss Air Force combat capability presentation and employment, 
expeditionary CE capabilities within that context, how CE has historically determined 
required manpower levels, how the concepts of organizational learning and knowledge 
management shaped CE expeditionary organizational innovation to produce the current 
hub-and-spoke concept of operation (CONOP), and the anecdotal suggestions of 
advantages realized as a result of its implementation. Finally, a discussion of subject 
matter expert (SME) opinion elicitation methods establishes the justification for use of 
the Delphi technique to address the identified knowledge management need at hand.  
Airpower Presentation and Employment 
Air Force force planning is rooted in operational doctrine and the policy 
documents, handbooks, and pamphlets that flow from that doctrine. Formulating the 
context in which this manpower planning problem exists requires understanding these 
publications and the overarching national security strategy directed by the commander-in-
chief. Continued study of how to present and employ CE capabilities in support of 
combat operations more effectively is an operational imperative. Reductions in personnel 
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and budget resources as the Air Force continues to evaluate the use of Cold War-era 
theater-level, scenario-based force planning factors versus the capabilities-based factors 
that define the post-9/11 Department of Defense (DoD) introduce unique and often-
dynamic manpower planning constraints. 
Understanding the Air Force doctrine that developed from the statutory basis for 
its existence requires a brief review of United States defense policy in the past several 
decades. The Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act formally indicated that each 
branch of service (Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps) is responsible for 
organizing, training, and equipping forces to support unified combatant commands. A 
senior general officer, typically from alternating branches of service, commands each 
unified combatant command. They are directly responsible for prosecuting military 
operations within its given area of responsibility (AOR). This command structure and 
associated responsibilities foster a joint approach to warfighting wherein capabilities 
from each branch of service are designed to be leveraged to fulfill missions most 
effectively (Goldwater & Nichols, 1986). 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act drives current budgetary and resources request 
processes. Title 50, United States Code, Section 404a, requires the executive branch to 
issue the National Security Strategy (NSS) annually (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011b). 
Among other issues of national security concern, it ultimately communicates to 
COCOMs those major contingencies they must be prepared to execute to most effectively 
support United States foreign policy objectives. Policy documents that the NSS initiates, 
including the National Defense Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 
Unified Command Plan, and Guidance for the Employment of the Force, ultimately drive 
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expectations of troop numbers and equipment. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
(JSCP) formally communicates the capabilities that manpower and associated materiel 
are expected to provide. Each Service Chief of Staff, COCOM, and other Defense 
agencies use the JSCP to develop requirements to accomplish tasks and mission based on 
near-term military capabilities. Thus, JSCP implements deliberate planning guidance 
(Department of the Air Force, 2006b). 
The Air Force developed the Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) construct 
within this context. The AEF represents "the Air Force's methodology for organizing, 
training, equipping, and sustaining rapidly responsive air and space forces to meet 
defense strategy requirements” (Department of the Air Force, 2011b). In short, the Air 
Force presents its capabilities to COCOMs by means of the AEF. The doctrinal tenet of 
ACS, which is critical to the facilitation of combat airpower projection, is embedded 
within the AEF construct. CEs act as an integral part of the synergy that happens between 
the transportation, materiel logistics, installation security, maintenance, and human 
resources capabilities traditionally considered ACS components (Department of the Air 
Force, 2005). 
Expeditionary CE Capabilities in Context 
Air Force Doctrine Document 3-34, Engineer Operations (Department of the Air 
Force, 2011a), states that the CE functional community's primary ACS responsibility is to 
“provide, operate, maintain, and protect sustainable installations as weapon system 
platforms through engineering and emergency response services across the full mission 
spectrum.” This allusion to the full mission spectrum includes a broad range of 
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contingencies that CE must be prepared to address. At one end, the potential exists for 
operations to be based from installations where the existing facilities are more than 
adequate for sustained operations. At the other extreme, supported commanders may 
require CE to be a part of the initial seizure of an airfield location and construct the base's 
infrastructure from scratch (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). The evolution of this 
unique range of capabilities drives how CE organized, trained, and equipped (Department 
of the Air Force, 1999). 
Air Force expeditionary operations distinguish CE capability in two ways: Rapid 
Engineer, Deployable Heavy Repair Squadron, Engineer (RED HORSE) and Prime Base 
Emergency Engineer Force (BEEF) teams (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). The 
lines of specific task delineation are often blurred, but at their core, they fulfill unique 
portions of the CE mission. While so-called low density, high demand resources like 
pavement evaluation teams and major command (MAJCOM) staff augmentees also 
provide critical support to COCOMs, they make up a relatively small percentage of the 
overall number of Air Force CEs postured to support contingencies. 
RED HORSE 
RED HORSE organizes, trains, and equips its personnel to provide COCOMs 
with expeditionary base heavy construction and repair capabilities. These forces are 
capable of self-sustaining operations as they execute tasks related to water well drilling, 
demolition, quarry operations, concrete and asphalt batch plant operations, paving, and 
large expedient base construction. In contingency situations, the combined forces air 
component commander (CFACC) of the unified command's area of responsibility (AOR) 
to which the capability is attached controls overall RED HORSE direction. This 
 16 
command and control (C2) relationship ensures the highest probability that their unique 
capabilities will be utilized in the most effective manner theater-wide. When not directly 
supporting an active contingency, these units fall under the command of a Numbered Air 
Force (NAF) and fulfill construction and repair projects not necessarily in direct support 
of expeditionary operations (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). 
Prime BEEF 
Personnel aligned with Prime BEEF teams are typically part of a stateside Civil 
Engineer Squadron (CES) whose primary responsibility is to maintain the installation to 
which they are permanently assigned. These craftspersons and engineers fulfill traditional 
home station installation support functions full time, with readiness exercises providing 
scenario-specific practice in contingency CE skills (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). 
The Prime BEEF concept evolved out of an emerging expeditionary facilities 
requirement after World War II, through the Korean War, and into the Southeast Asia 
War. An Air Force CE study group meeting in the late 1960s noted the following 
(Marlin, 1987): 
Problems plaguing [Air Force CE] at this time included the following: 1) AFCE 
had no appreciable mobile response capability for contingencies, 2) AFCE lacked 
uniformity in the military/civilian mix from base to base, 3) AFCE provided 
inadequate career progression for military members, and 4) AFCE had shown 
itself improperly aligned to meet several pre-1964 crises. 
To meet these challenges and provide COCOMs with more effective infrastructure 
support, a former director of Air Force CE noted “the Prime BEEF program was initiated 
to provide responsive, compact temporary duty (TDY) Civil Engineering forces of 
specific military skills for direct support of short-term combat operations” (Marlin, 
1987). These teams primarily perform force beddown and war damage repair tasks at the 
 17 
locations to which the flying squadrons they support in wartime deploy. Requirements for 
sizes of teams in these situations are typically based on the anticipated facility and 
infrastructure needs of all Air Force units – flying and non-flying – at a given deployed 
location (Cummings, 1997; Department of the Air Force, 2011b). 
In contingency scenarios, an Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron (ECES) 
CONOP often drives how these teams are organized, commanded, and controlled. They 
are designed to provide on-going, general contingency engineering support directly to a 
supported wing commander or equivalent. While these units facilitate theater-level 
operational objectives through their support to the local operator, they are not 
traditionally directly commanded or controlled by the command echelon above the wing 
level. 
Expeditionary Capabilities Applied 
RED HORSE and Prime BEEF teams support four primary categories of 
expeditionary bases. The Forward Operating Location (FOL) is an airfield utilized for 
short-term contingencies like counter-drug or combat search and rescue (CSAR) 
missions. Operational constraints limit FOL infrastructure development to minimum 
standards. Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) airfields are primarily supporting tactical, 
CSAR, and reconnaissance operations without establishing full support facilities. FOBs 
may be used for an extended duration, but they require main operating base support to 
sustain combat operations. A Main Operating Base (MOB) is normally occupied by one 
or more wings, typically representing 550 or more personnel. These installations are 
continuously operated and possess in-place Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) command 
structures, robust expeditionary combat support (ECS), and logistics supply functions. 
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Intermediate Staging Bases (ISBs) are locations or airfields used to stage forces prior to 
inserting combat forces into the forward theater of operations. These locations have large 
transient cargo and personnel requirements and normally require greater planning factors 
for cargo ramps and ECS to accommodate robust asset movement. A fifth type of base is 
often minimally operated by contracted labor for the purpose of maintaining 
prepositioned assets with initial beddown infrastructure. These so-called “warm” bases 
may be “heated up” to facilitate rapid deployment of personnel and weapons systems to a 
forward expeditionary location (Department of the Air Force, 2006a). 
COCOMs issue construction standards for each type of installation as a surrogate 
measure of expected contingency operation duration. These standards in turn provide 
guidance to force planners calculating manpower recommendations,. These typically fall 
into four main categories. The Expeditionary Standard is meant to be in place for up to 90 
days. This is the expected life-cycle of a FOL or FOB. The Initial Standard is designed to 
be used for up to 6 months and requires a minimum of specialized engineering effort to 
sustain operations. Bases to be utilized for up to 24 months are typically built to the 
Temporary Standard. Military Construction (MILCON) projects worth in excess of 
$750,000 are often programmed and executed to provide this level of infrastructure. 
When a base is planned to be utilized for longer than 2 years, it is considered “enduring” 
and thus benefits from MILCON-level construction of semi-permanent and permanent 
facilities (Department of the Air Force, 2006a). 
Core tasks CE units are expected to execute in the course of making any 
installation operate at peak effectiveness are organized around in four main areas: 1) 
force beddown, 2) airfield damage repair, 3) facilities damage repair, and 4) general 
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contingency responsibilities (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). The combat 
engineering aspect of military engineering is associated with providing direct support to 
the maneuver of land forces. Clearing routes of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and 
breaching obstacles are two examples of how combat engineering capability enables 
mobility, counter-mobility, and survivability (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011a). Air Force CE 
is not organized, trained, or equipped to provide combat engineering capabilities 
(Department of the Air Force, 2011a). 
While not an all-inclusive list, the following tasks are expected in the course of 
force beddown situations (Department of the Air Force, 2011b): 
 Revetment of unsheltered aircraft 
 Expanding aircraft parking ramps by laying airfield matting 
 Constructing earth berms and dikes for fuel bladders or unsheltered aircraft  
 Modifying existing facilities for alternate use 
 Erecting bare base facilities and equipment 
 Installing power generation systems 
 Installing airfield and installation perimeter lighting 
 Providing all essential utilities 
 Constructing earth berms and access roads for bomb dumps 
 Constructing communication tower foundations 
 Facility hardening, construction and maintenance of force protection 
enhancements 
 Establishing and maintaining installation contaminated equipment storage, 
holding, or disposal areas  
Depending on the persistence, abilities, and chance opportunities exploited by human and 
natural adversaries, airfield damage repair tasks can vary widely. While historically, 
U.S.-held airfields have not experienced catastrophic attack by a determined antagonist 
since World War II, Air Force CE maintains the ability to execute wide-ranging rapid 
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airfield damage repairs (Department of the Air Force, 2011b). These tasks include 
(Department of the Air Force, 2011b): 
 Identifying unexploded ordnance (UXO) and coordinating disposal 
 Determining minimum operating strip (MOS) dimensions 
 Repairing craters and spalls 
 Assembling and placing foreign object damage (FOD) covers 
 Performing mechanized FOD sweeping operations 
 Assembling and placing manufactured load bearing airfield surface matting 
 Applying airfield markings 
 Installing and maintaining airfield lighting systems  
Facility damage repair tasks are expected to include the application of a wide variety of 
expedient construction and repair methods to keep mission-critical facilities operational. 
Tasks associated with base recovery after attack include (Department of the Air Force, 
2011b):  
 Assisting with search and rescue efforts 
 Assessing facility systems damage 
 Wrecking and demolition 
 Reporting UXOs and coordinating safing operations 
 Restoring functionality of facilities, utilities, and equipment  
General contingency responsibilities fall into four primary areas: 1) anti-terrorism and 
force protection, 2) determination of facility requirements, 3) base master planning, and 
4) contracted construction management (Department of the Air Force, 2011a). In addition 
to fulfilling these responsibilities in the active phases of contingencies, they are also 
applied to pre-conflict operations designed to assist building partner nation capacity in 
areas like the Asia-Pacific region (David, 2010; Hoyler, 2010; Rojas, 2011).  
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Determining CE Manpower Requirements 
Periodically, functional area leaders at the Headquarters Air Force (HAF) level 
initiate a comprehensive evaluation to determine the total personnel required to execute 
the missions they may be called upon to carry out. This process is known colloquially as 
the “Blue Suit Review.” SMEs determine their best recommendation for manpower levels 
based on the required CE capabilities given a certain set of scenarios (Department of the 
Air Force, 2006b). In the absence of directed guidance specifically outlining the level to 
which Air Force capabilities and manpower will be utilized by the Joint operational 
community, planners must make educated assumptions based on their own experiences 
and on feedback from the field about how many personnel it will take to sustain their 
assigned missions (Cummings, 2012). 
Contingency CE manpower requirements are most heavily influenced by the 
following variables (Cummings, 2012; Department of the Air Force, 2011a; Department 
of the Air Force, 2011b): 
 Wartime workload 
 Wartime man-hour availability 
 Continuing requirements (those tasks required to continue base operations) 
 Climatic factors that may affect man-hour availability 
 Anticipated tenant, COB, FOL, and/or bare base requirements 
 The possibility of noncombatant evacuation 
 How effectively manning/asset attrition is addressed by higher headquarters 
 The availability of ongoing contracted services  
By engaging in a continuous cycle of deliberate contingency planning during peacetime, 
COCOMs and supporting entities identify the capabilities required to support a wide 
range of operations based on scenarios and threats identified in the JSCP (Department of 
the Air Force, 2006a). 
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Currently, CE manpower planners use   
Equation 1 to produce recommendations for the total CE operations and 
engineering personnel required at each installation to support sustainment phase 
operations: 
                          Y = 61.42 + 0.05584x 
 
where Y is total CE personnel require and x is weighted floor space. 
 (1)  
Equation 1 
 
The weighted floor space is equal to the total floor space located on the 
installation and any outlying areas with a similar standard of living measured in 
thousands of square feet (KSF) multiplied by the Base Square Footage Weighting Factor 
(BSFWF). The BSFWF is based on labor intensity weights established by real property 
codes. Three categories of labor requirements (high, 0.47; average, 0.33; and low, 0.20) 
are applied to derive base-specific factors (Department of the Air Force, 2011b). 
Minimal published guidance currently exists to guide the determination of CE 
hub-and-spoke unit manning requirements. The calculations to determine the hub-and-
spoke manning level required to present effective general engineering capability to the 
supported commander are typically ad hoc. As expected in dynamic contingency 
environments, situations unfold where increased manpower and floor space capacity must 
be provided on severely abbreviated timelines (Department of the Air Force, 1999). At 
these times, supported commanders need a revised method of employing readily surge-
able CE capability to seize and hold the initiative. CE manpower planners require a 
method of determining whether adopting the use of a hub-and-spoke-type organization 
has the highest probability of providing the operational advantages realized in SWA 
operations, whether the current organizational model offers the highest probability of 
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effective support, or if the widespread implementation of a new hub-and-spoke 
organizational CONOP may best meet supported commander objectives. 
Origin of the Prime BEEF Hub-and-spoke Organization 
The military-political environment in which Operations ENDURING FREEDM 
(OEF) and IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) were undertaken catalyzed a shift in senior military 
and Executive Branch civilian approach to Joint operations. A series of Army force 
utilization decisions created a severe deficit in its uniformed combat service support 
capability (Allen, 2009; Bosworth, 2012). Particularly affected was its general 
engineering capability, specifically in the tactical infrastructure planning, design, 
construction, maintenance and repair disciplines. When the on-the-ground consequences 
of this deficit began to emerge, leaders serving on Joint staffs were challenged to find an 
expedient solution. Employing expeditionary Air Force CE capability in direct support of 
Army infrastructure requirements was determined to be the ideal Joint warfighting 
solution (Bosworth, 2012). Formal requests for forces (RFFs) were issued and Air Force 
CE personnel aligned with Prime BEEF unit type codes (UTCs) were deployed on what 
initially became known as in-lieu-of (ILO) taskings and then Joint Expeditionary 
Taskings (JETs). 
Prime BEEF personnel were initially placed under the tactical control (TACON) 
of fielded Army brigade combat team (BCT) commanders as one-for-one replacements in 
their imbedded utilities detachments (U-Det) and facility engineer teams (FET). 
Organizationally, the size and scope of operations characterized by BCTs make them a 
rough equivalent to an Air Force wing, typically commanded by a colonel or brigadier 
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general. Similarly, the infrastructure support these Air Force CE teams provided to BCT 
commanders was analogous to that which they provided Air Force wing commanders 
(Allen, 2009; Bosworth, 2012). 
Feedback received from supported Army BCT commanders regarding the 
effectiveness of employing expeditionary Air Force CE capability in this way was 
generally outstanding. However, through several deployment rotations, manpower 
challenges associated with aligning Air Force CE capability directly under the control of 
an Army brigade commander became apparent. Furthermore, concerns related to 
potential undermining of Air Force CEs ability to provide beddown and sustainment of 
airpower were raised as Air Force CE capability was flexed to support Joint requirements 
(Allen, 2009). 
Direct, end-of-tour interview, and after action report (AAR) feedback provided by 
Air Force teams attached to BCT command staffs suggested wide disparities in the 
workload experienced by teams attached to different BCTs (AFIT CES Faculty, 2010). 
No process existed to shift those personnel in one BCT who were not as busy with 
mission-critical work to provide workload relief to those teams in a separate BCT who 
were task saturated fulfilling mission-critical infrastructure requirements. The same 
challenge existed for shifting materials and expertise. Institutional differences in how 
supported commanders leverage engineer capability also meant that Air Force CE 
personnel were often called upon to perform tasks well outside the general engineering 
capabilities they were deployed to provide. Those institutional differences also created 
significant challenges and administrative and tactical control over fielded Air Force CE 
forces were separated between two branches of service (AFIT CES Faculty, 2010). 
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Furthermore, an effective system for providing feedback to pre-deployment training 
centers and to planners who might be able to tailor the requests for forces capabilities to 
those that met emerging requirements in-theater remained chronically elusive (Frey, 
2009). These challenges appeared to compound as Air Force CE operations tempo 
(OPSTEMPO) levels increased to unsustainable levels, home station missions began to 
be affected, and personnel retention issues were identified (Allen, 2009).  
Practitioners and researchers have long-understood that most innovations are the 
result of borrowing or building on previous innovation, rather than invention from scratch 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; March & Simon, 1958). This was certainly the case as 
functional Air Force CE leaders more intentionally considered the application of 
knowledge gained as a result of supporting over 7 years of continuous overseas 
contingency operations to the problem of how to best present expeditionary CE 
capabilities to their Joint functional partners (Allen, 2009). By 2009, Air Force CE 
leadership had successfully made the case for realignment and consolidation of Air Force 
CE forces fulfilling general engineering responsibilities in direct support of the Army and 
Marines operating in Afghanistan. By design, the command echelon above the BCT level 
controlled the newly proposed Expeditionary Prime BEEF Group (EPBG) with the 
purpose of supporting regional engineer task forces. Bagram Airfield served as the 
headquarters for the EBPG, with squadron headquarters hubs at three major airfields 
located around Afghanistan. Spoke teams would then forward deploy to Army and 
Marine FOBs to perform general engineering tasks, including light vertical construction; 
surveying; life, health, and safety utilities inspections and repairs; base master planning; 
minor construction project programming; design; and construction management (Allen, 
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2009). Feedback from supported units has served as a proof of concept for the EPBG's 
hub-and-spoke style of organization also utilized by RED HORSE units for their service 
in SWA (Yolitz, 2009).  
A new iteration of the hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE unit concept 
emerged in late 2011. Statutory limits, most closely related to boots-on-ground (BOG) 
constraints in Afghanistan as part of the so-called surge recovery operations, drove 
planners to consider an over-the-horizon approach to providing expeditionary CE 
capability. This CONOP stipulated that with the exception of lean contingents of CE 
personnel at various installations, expeditionary CE capability would be centrally 
commanded and controlled from a major enduring location far to the rear of the primary 
action. Resources were provided such that CE personnel would fulfill both Air Force and 
Joint infrastructure requirements, often thousands of miles removed.  
The newly-formed 1st Expeditionary Civil Engineer Group (ECEG) met this 
command and control (C2) and logistics challenge by providing "highly mobile, light and 
heavy construction and repair capability throughout the AFCENT area of responsibility 
when requirements or threat levels exceed normal civil engineer unit capabilities" 
(AFCENT, 2012). It thus unified Prime BEEF and RED HORSE capabilities under one 
commander, a colonel, and more closely controlled the prioritization and utilization of 
their capabilities. Headquartered at Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, and reporting directly to 
the AFCENT CFACC, it maintained SWA-wide visibility of infrastructure requirements. 
The success experienced by the 1 ECEG suggests that this over-the-horizon hub-and-
spoke innovation should be considered for implementation in support of contingencies in 
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other theaters. However, doing so first requires an examination of the factors contributing 
to this success. 
Codifying and Applying Observations, Innovations, and Lessons Learned 
Through guidance documents like the 2010 QDR and National Security Strategy 
of 2012, the current administration has directed active reevaluation of Pacific Command 
(PACOM) operations plans (OPLANs) (Gates, 2010; White House, 2012). This strategic 
guidance ultimately informs the organizational planning of the aggregate functional 
communities that support the execution of those OPLANs. Congressionally-mandated 
resource constraints further affect overall manpower authorizations DoD-wide, driving 
decision-makers to reevaluate the way in which remaining personnel resources are 
employed to support given OPLANs. These decision-makers often look to recent military 
organizational and process innovations to inform their recommendations about future 
organizing, training, and equipping actions. Characterizing and attempting to replicate the 
success factors that gave the supported CFACC the operational advantages that hub-and-
spoke organized CE units did may provide future commanders with similar operational 
advantages. Being aware of the challenges posed by certain circumstances can also 
increase the likelihood that these challenges may be effectively identified and overcome 
in future contingencies.  
Air Force policy regarding the creation and dissemination of new knowledge 
takes its formal cues from Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 8260.01, Support 
for Strategic Analysis, and DODI 8260.2, Implementation of Data Collection, 
Development, and Management for Strategic Analyses. Air Force policy states that AARs 
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are one of the primary means by which observations of successes and challenges can be 
collected and lessons learned gleaned. These reports become the published products that 
reconstruct specific events or combat operations through the lens of the participants' 
firsthand knowledge and experience. One of their primary objectives is to assist Airmen 
in the incorporation of knowledge that facilitates more effective and efficient prosecution 
of assigned missions. To that end, these reports "describe how the mission could be/was 
improved, potential risks to mission degradation, and how to mitigate those risks" 
(Department of the Air Force, 2010). 
While the successful application of the hub-and-spoke concept to expeditionary 
CE operations in SWA has catalyzed discussions of potential courses of action in the Air 
Force CE functional community, additional rigor must be applied to more fully distill 
lessons learned and their potential application to hub-and-spoke-organized CE units in 
future contingencies. Little in the way of published material has been produced 
documenting operational knowledge applicable to this problem. A theoretical basis for 
operational CE force planning tools required characterization. A knowledge gap existed 
that required collection and analysis of qualitative data about the challenges and 
successes SWA CE hub-and-spoke-organized units experienced. From these data, it 
would be possible to determine factors leading to the success of these units. Data of the 
types included in AARs prepared by unit commanders and gleaned from input by a panel 
of CE functional SMEs with first-hand experience working with the personnel and 
processes involved with the hub-and-spoke concept had to be collected and analyzed. 
From these data, a basis could be established for further research into operational tools to 
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assist manpower planners considering hub-and-spoke presentation of expeditionary CE 
surge capabilities in support of future contingencies. 
The AARs produced by recent hub-and-spoke unit commanders capture 
observations, innovations, and lessons learned  (OILs) developed as a result of Air Force 
expeditionary CE capability being organized in a hub-and-spoke fashion in SWA. They 
address primarily tactical challenges with some regard to how these may be overcome in 
contexts other than those in which the unit operated. Some of these OILs have broader 
applicability to hub-and-spoke organization manpower requirements generally. They may 
also apply to CE hub-and-spoke organizations supporting CFACCs in other AORs. 
Analysis of their content can yield valuable input into how to most effectively organize 
expeditionary CE capability. Further canvassing of organizational knowledge held by 
those senior leaders who had firsthand experience with both the SWA hub-and-spoke CE 
units and other contexts in which this CONOP may be applied has a higher probability of 
determining valid recommendations. 
Nonaka (2007) argues that the ultimate competitive advantage against an 
adversary is knowledge, stating "where the only certainty is uncertainty, the one sure 
source of lasting competitive advantage is knowledge." Furthermore, the "secret [of] 
success is [a] unique approach to managing the creation of new knowledge” (Nonaka, 
1991).  Kogut and Zander (1992) present multiple cases where highly successful 
organizations whose operations transcend national borders rely on the effective 
codification and dissemination of the knowledge gained as a result of a process of 
organizational knowledge creation. On this view, effective organizations commit to this 
"process of making available and amplifying knowledge created by individuals as well as 
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crystallizing and connecting it to an organization’s knowledge system" (Nonaka & von 
Krogh, 2009)  . Nonaka and von Krogh (2009) further state that in highly dynamic 
operational contexts, those organizations who are most consistently successful are those 
that "create new knowledge, disseminate it widely throughout the organization, and 
quickly embody it" into new ways of executing their mission. Creating new knowledge 
often requires "tapping the tacit and often highly subjective insights, intuitions, and 
hunches of individual[s] and making those insights available for...use by the 
[organization] as a whole." Being highly personal and context-dependent, tacit 
knowledge can be difficult to formalize and communicate to others (Nonaka, 2007). 
Nevertheless, it is imperative that qualitative data and knowledge be solicited. 
Stakeholders must then use that knowledge to move from tacit applications to explicit 
ones by providing tools for others in the organization to utilize. 
Cantwell and Mudambi (2011) argue that the best way for a large organization 
with global reach to maintain and extend its competitive edge is to find a way to 
effectively access those with possession of local knowledge. Their research suggests that 
the extent to which such a multi-national organization can effectively assimilate new 
competencies generated at a tactical level determines how effectively it can leverage 
competitive advantages by implementing these competencies more broadly. In their view, 
effective organizational knowledge creation paradigms must be established from the top 
down so that lessons may be effectively disseminated and applied. 
However, Govindarajan and Ramamurti (2011) noted most recently "legacy 
internal organizational structure, legacy routines, and cognitive maps may act as barriers" 
to organizational knowledge creation and must be addressed in order for effective 
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learning to occur. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) argue that absorptive capacity (AC) is the 
ability of an organization to overcome those barriers to assimilate external information 
and apply it to beneficial use. AC becomes a function of prior related knowledge, which 
is often required to be intentionally documented and disseminated. Lack of early 
investment in expertise like force planning skills among Air Force CE officers may 
"foreclose the future development of capability in that area" (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). 
Therefore, an evolving theoretical groundwork for force planning and organizational 
innovation must be set so the Air Force CE functional community maintains its edge into 
the future. A necessary method of laying this groundwork involves the solicitation of 
SME opinion and analysis of the content of their responses. 
Eliciting Expert Opinion 
Numerous non-experimental techniques are available to assist the researcher with 
soliciting and analyzing qualitative inputs from a group. The most widely used are 
surveys, interviews, and questionnaires. Each method possesses relative strengths and 
disadvantages when applied to various contexts. 
Surveys are typically used to gather data from a randomly selected population 
sample. Researchers then take that sample's responses and attempt to make judgments 
about the characteristics or opinions of the population at-large (Krathwohl, 1998). Patton 
(2009) notes that participants "are interviewed, questioned, or otherwise observed so that 
their attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors as they exist without experimental intervention are 
determined." Respondent pools often number over one hundred, the volume of questions 
is relatively limited, and there is little opportunity for follow-up or clarifying questions 
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(Patten, 2009). While especially appropriate in contexts where questions can be 
appropriately designed to collect certain data, a survey of senior CE leader opinion did 
not appear appropriate. 
Another often-utilized method of qualitative data gathering is the semi-structured 
interview. These interactions are typically face-to-face and recorded (Patten, 2009). Time 
commitment on the part of both the respondent and researcher is high, especially if 
follow-up interview sessions are required to clarify perspective based on subsequent data 
gathering (Krathwohl, 1998). While time constraints posed a serious challenge to the use 
of interviews for this study, the most significant challenge was the one presented by the 
geographical separation of participants. 
Use of questionnaires through the application of a Delphi technique appeared to 
hold distinct advantages over all other methodologies. While variations exist, the main 
concept behind the Delphi technique centers on attempting to facilitate a group 
communication process that allows a group of individuals, taken as a whole, to address a 
complex problem.  It starts with the distribution of an initial questionnaire to members of 
a group and inviting them to respond individually. The primary goal of a Delphi study is 
to define reality by facilitating interaction (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). It is among the 
handful of research methods based on grounded theory, which states that by its nature, 
qualitative research tends to apply inductive means of data analysis. Researchers collect 
and analyze qualitative inputs and develop theories grounded in those data (Patten, 2009). 
Four distinctive features of a typical Delphi study make the definition of reality 
possible: anonymity among Delphi participants, iteration, controlled feedback, and 
statistical aggregation of group responses (Rowe & Wright, 1999). Whereas surveys tend 
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to answer "what is" questions, Delphi studies often attempt to determine "what 
could/should be" (Miller, 2001). These characteristics made the Delphi technique well-
suited for the objectives of the SME opinion solicitation required by this research effort. 
Furthermore, while other distribution means were available, literature confirms that e-
mail communication in the Delphi study can be highly effective. Sheehan and McMillan 
(2011) note one advantage on which this research effort sought to capitalize. Specifically, 
electronic mail messages tend to have higher response rates over traditional hardcopy 
mail. Additionally, they promote faster response times, and respondents typically appear 
more willing to reply to open-ended questions. 
The Delphi Method 
A growing body of research finds that the Delphi method of SME opinion 
elicitation can work well in helping investigate incomplete knowledge about a problem or 
phenomenon (Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). It has the potential to focus group 
knowledge on an issue and structure that group's communication in a way that allows that 
knowledge to address it. The Delphi technique is also effective at meeting the double 
challenge of attempting to forecast requirements years into the future when quantitative 
data to do so is minimally existent (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). 
After responses to an initial questionnaire have been received from a sample of 
participants, they are summarized and sent with a second questionnaire back to the 
respondents. This iterative process continues until responses demonstrate stability and 
consensus. Evidence from the literature that the Delphi technique can “seek out 
information which may generate a consensus on the part of the respondent group” and 
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“correlate informed judgments on a topic spanning a wide range of disciplines” confirms 
the appropriateness of its use in determining success factors and their potential 
applicability in other contexts (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975). Similar time-
sensitive, qualitative research efforts have confirmed the value of implementing 
variations of the Delphi technique to gather and analyze relevant SME opinion (Deason, 
2009). Peer-reviewed precedent has been established for the use of the Delphi method of 
SME opinion solicitation in cases where a requirement exists to structure group 
communication to meet a stated research objective (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). Using the 
Delphi technique can be particularly effective at gathering and evaluating opinions held 
by heterogeneous groups of experts like those who maintain the largely tacit body of hub-
and-spoke CE manpower planning knowledge (Rowe & Wright, 1999). 
Use of a Delphi technique to solicit and analyze subject matter expert opinion 
presents the possibility of other, more practical advantages. Participants in a study guided 
by the Delphi technique are not required to be geographically co-located. The ability of 
panel members to be physically separated yet still provide meaningful inputs offers a 
particular advantage to this research since multiple time zones separate the SMEs most 
qualified to participate in this study. By utilizing iterative questionnaires, the Delphi 
technique makes it possible to elicit opinion that is relatively free from influence from 
other participants, thus protecting against bias and maximizing the probability that honest 
opinions will be shared. The time required for inputs to be received and analyzed can be 
abbreviated compared to focus groups and interviews by allowing participants to respond 
on their own time in a semi-asynchronous manner (Linstone & Turoff, 2002; Rowe & 
Wright, 2001). 
 35 
Rowe and Wright (1999) first argue that an effective Delphi study must use 
experts who possess the appropriate domain knowledge. In addition to adequately 
informing the sharing of their opinions in the initial round of questions, having the 
appropriate expertise also ensures they are appropriately influenced, or not influenced, by 
other panelists' opinions. This study's intent was to follow four guidelines for selecting 
SME panel members. These included: 1) knowledge and experience with the issues under 
investigation, 2) capacity and willingness to participate, 3) sufficient time to participate, 
and 4) effective communication skills (Adler & Ziglio, 2002; Skulmoski, Hartman, & 
Krahn, 2007). 
Reliance on qualitative expert opinion as the primary basis for establishing a 
theoretical framework has its drawbacks. However, when appropriate guidelines are 
followed, Delphi studies have a proven track record of producing meaningful results. 
Rowe and Wright (2001) outline several key principles to consider when designing and 
executing a Delphi study. Several specific Delphi technique considerations were 
addressed in the design of this study in an attempt to avoid common challenges 
experienced in similar research efforts. They were related to question formulation, 
sample size, number of rounds expected to reach consensus, and mode of interaction. 
The first negative tendency of some efforts is to query the SME panel with 
questions that subsequently prove to be too broad. The knowledge characteristics that 
make certain SMEs good candidates for participation are the very reason these SMEs are 
often heavily saturated with regular work tasks. Thus, individual panel members may 
have only a limited amount of quality time to devote to responding to questionnaires. The 
task of analyzing the resulting glut of unfocused perspectives becomes time consuming 
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for the researcher as well and introduces a risk of overlooking critical insights 
(Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). This challenge can be addressed by focusing the 
initial questions, limiting their number, and providing sufficient background information 
about the study's premise and potential benefits to motivate focused responses. 
Consideration must also be given to sample size in the formation of the Delphi 
SME panel. Literature suggests a wide range of potentially valid opinion sample sizes, 
with a general increase in decision quality and reduction in error as sample sizes increase. 
However, large groups tend to compound challenges related to data collection, analytic 
complexity, reaching consensus, and verifying results (Linstone & Turoff, 2002; 
Skulmoski, Hartman, & Krahn, 2007). This dilemma was moderated by the fact that the 
participation commitment was obtained from a high percentage of those holding salient 
knowledge regarding recent expeditionary CE organizational innovations. It would be 
inappropriate to argue that this study is a census of all those who may have an informed 
opinion on the nature of past expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke operations and potential 
future innovation. However, a large enough segment of CE senior leaders was 
communicated with during the scoping phase of the research that it is probable that an 
appropriate number of participants were canvassed.  
Literature Review Summary 
This chapter provided the statutory and theoretical bases for this research effort. It 
outlined the laws and policies that direct the support relationships between the 
MAJCOMs and unified combatant commands. Following this strategic level overview 
was a discussion of how the Air Force organizes, trains, and equips its own forces to 
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support the COCOM, including how Air Force CE capabilities are employed within this 
context and how the CE functional community determines overall manpower 
requirements. The latest iteration of expeditionary CE capabilities presentation in the 
form of the ECEG hub-and-spoke was followed by an argument for how to best codify 
and apply applicable OILs to a hub-and-spoke model fulfilling future contingency 
requirements. Chapter III presents how the Delphi technique was adapted for use by this 
research. 
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III. Methodology 
This research effort used grounded theory, specifically utilizing the Delphi 
method, to gather and analyze qualitative data regarding Air Force expeditionary CE 
manpower planning. This was accomplished by eliciting opinions of CE functional SMEs 
while considering two primary constraints: 1) the need for utilizing a systematic process 
featuring proven methods of qualitative data analysis and 2) accounting for the time 
constraints introduced by both the expert panel members and the research project itself. A 
two-phase qualitative investigation undertaken using the Delphi technique provided the 
most effective means of soliciting SME opinion by possessing the highest perceived 
likelihood of yielding meaningful data. 
Delphi Study Design 
A purposeful sample of SMEs was assembled before initiating the formal steps of 
the Delphi study. Selecting the appropriate mix of SME panel members is a critical 
component of the application of the Delphi technique since it is upon these panel 
members' expert opinions that the output of the research is based (Skulmoski, Hartman, 
& Krahn, 2007). Hsu and Sandford (2002) further argue “choosing the appropriate 
subjects is the most important step in the entire process because it directly relates to the 
quality of the results generated.”  While the literature suggests that successful panel 
selection is essential to generating valid Delphi study results, little in the way of standard 
criteria for SME selection has been published. However, a list proposed by Skulmoski et 
al. (2007) and augmented by Scheele (2002) appeared to offer an appropriate list of 
credentials for this effort. Specifically, participants should meet the following six 
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requirements to be considered a SME (Linstone & Turoff, 2002; Skulmoski, Hartman, & 
Krahn, 2007) : 
 Knowledge and experience with the issue under investigation 
 Capacity and willingness to participate 
 Sufficient time to participate in the study 
 Effective communication skills 
 Those who are or will be directly affected 
 Those who have skills in clarifying, organizing, synthesizing, stimulating 
The research approached potential participants who had previously served or were 
currently serving in key CE manpower planning or command positions directly 
associated with both CE hub-and-spoke-organized units in SWA and those units whose 
organizational disposition represented more traditional, or legacy, organizational 
alignments. Additionally, those who possessed Headquarters Air Force-level operational 
perspectives were also desired. Only SMEs from within the CE functional community 
were sought out due to time constraints and the complexity of logistics associated with 
tracking down and eliciting the opinions of supported commanders.  
The true population size of those holding the requisite perspective on 
expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke cannot be stated with absolute certainty. However, 
discussions with key research stakeholders indicated that approximately 20 individuals 
likely held the corporate knowledge required to produce meaningful research data. This 
population primarily consisted of Active Duty and Reserve commissioned officers in the 
grades of O-5 and O-6 each with over 20 years of military service, primarily in the CE 
career field. Also included in this population were select Active Duty senior non-
commissioned officers and civilians who had recently retired. According to the latest 
guidance published by the Air Force Personnel Center, individuals in these grades have 
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typically served multiple tours in support of Joint and multinational military operations, 
at the local installation level, MAJCOM staffs, Air Force Headquarters, and others (Air 
Force Personnel Center, 2010). The panel thus acted as "stakeholders, those who are or 
will be directly affected; experts, those who have an applicable specialty or relevant 
experience; and facilitators, those who have skills in clarifying, organizing, synthesizing, 
stimulating” (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). Of these, a sample of nine was selected to 
participate in the study, primarily due to the availability of respondents, perceived level 
of commitment, and ability to respond within the requested timeframes. The Delphi study 
proceeded once this purposeful sample was established. 
The literature suggests that two to ten iterations of questionnaire distribution, 
response, analysis, and verification may be necessary to assist a Delphi research panel in 
reaching consensus (Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975). During each phase, 
respondents are given the opportunity to see the distilled results, provide feedback, and 
rate their agreement with them. This research adapted the steps summarized in Table 1 
from the work of Delbecq (1975) and Whittington (2012) and used them as the 
framework for the Delphi study. They assumed a three-questionnaire format while this 
research only used two. 
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Table 1. Delphi Study Steps 
Step Description 
1 The researcher develops an initial questionnaire and distributes it to the panel. 
2 Panelists independently generate answers for the questionnaire and electronically 
return it to the facilitator. 
3 The researcher summarizes the responses to the Phase One questionnaire, and 
drafts and distributes a follow-up questionnaire for the SME panel. 
4 Referencing the distributed questionnaire, panelists accomplish requested tasks 
5 The facilitator summarizes the responses to the Phase Two questionnaire and 
develops a final summary report. 
 
Step One initiates Phase One and begins with an open-ended questionnaire that 
seeks to solicit specific information about a content area from the SME panel (Hsu & 
Sandford, 2007). The initial questions for this research attempted to offer an opportunity 
to brainstorm without requiring more than 20 to 25 minutes of response time. This was 
accomplished by not initially requesting opinions about organizational success factors, 
but opinions about broader operational advantages that panelists perceived hub-and-
spoke CE units operating in southwest Asia (SWA) offered to supported commanders. 
Panelists were also asked to offer their opinions about which of these advantages could 
be replicated in other operational environments and which could not. Justifications for 
their opinions were also requested. Follow-up queries would then offer an opportunity to 
explore each operational advantage and associated success factors. 
The questions were then tested on AFIT student colleagues not involved in the 
questionnaire's design in an attempt to enhance their clarity and ensure responses would 
be appropriately focused. Once they were reviewed in this way internally, the 
questionnaire, researcher credentials, and proposed disclaimer documentation were 
reviewed by the AFIT Institutional Review Board (IRB). The IRB granted the Phase One 
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questionnaire an exemption from human experimentation requirements stipulated by 32 
CFR 219, DoDD 3216.2, and AFI 40-402, on 19 November 2012. Appendix  contains the 
exemption notice.  This study qualified for an exemption since no sensitive data was 
collected and respondent anonymity was maintained. As outlined in Step Two, the 
questionnaire was distributed via e-mail to the SME panel members. 
Step Three initiates Phase Two.  Results of the Phase One questionnaire are 
analyzed within the context of the research question, associated literature review, and 
general knowledge of the SME backgrounds. Given the diverse perspectives each of the 
panel members offered and the small sample size itself, it was determined that all 
respondents’ inputs would receive the same weight during the course of this analysis. The 
facilitator categorizes the inputs and requests that each panel member rate the degree to 
which they agree or disagree with the themes suggested by the panel's answers to the 
Phase One questionnaire. The panelists also review their Phase One responses to ensure 
their opinions were accurately captured, adjust answers upon review of other panel 
member responses, and provide additional feedback or qualifiers. In this analysis, they 
were asked to numerically rate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with each 
theme using a five-point Likert-style scale where 5 = Strongly Agree, 4 = Agree, 3 = 
Neutral, 2 = Disagree, and 1 = Strongly Disagree. Precedent exists that proves the Likert 
scale's ease of producing data to which descriptive statistics may be applied to determine 
measures of central tendency (Carifio & Perla, 2007; Linstone & Turoff, 2002). 
Additionally, the scale is a “quick, easy to comprehend, and psychologically comforting" 
method of eliciting follow-up SME opinion (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). As presented in 
Step Four, panelists review initial panel responses and refine, retract, or expand their 
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previous answers based on their perception of the group's responses.  Additionally, they 
typically “rate...items based off the responses to the first questionnaire in order to 
establish preliminary priorities among items” (Hsu & Sandford, 2007).  
Step Five initiates the final phase of the Delphi study with the analysis of the 
follow-up questionnaire using descriptive statistics. For this study, the researcher 
determined consensus and stability by statistical analysis of the Likert scale responses. 
Hsu and Sandford (2007) provided a framework in which to accomplish this analysis by 
noting “the major statistics used in Delphi studies are measures of central tendency...and 
level of dispersion...in order to present information concerning the collective judgments 
of respondents.” Inferential statistical techniques could not be used due to the unknown 
distribution of response values exhibited by such a small sample size and the grounded, 
inductive nature of the project. 
Keeney et al. (2005) confirm that the Delphi body of literature does not present a 
standardized method for determining consensus. However, guidelines exist to assist in the 
determination of when consensus has been reached. Typically, the research must use 
descriptive statistical tools like histograms, mean, median, or mode, and qualitative 
descriptions of the response data to present outcomes (Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & 
Wasserman, 1996). A significant body of literature suggests that the median is a favored 
measure of central tendency in Delphi studies utilizing a Likert Scale to measure degree 
of agreement (Eckman, 1983; Hill & Fowles, 1975; Hsu & Sandford, 2007). This is 
primarily due to the median's ability to moderate extreme answers. Depiction of the 
histogram produced by panel member responses also provides a means of gauging the 
level of consensus among the panelists. Neither standard deviation nor interquartile range 
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values were calculated due to the low sample size and subsequent inappropriateness of 
assuming any normality in response. It was thus determined that only the median scores 
and response histograms for each theme would be used to indicate degree of consensus. 
Step Five concludes with the researcher summarizing the results and offering 
potential conclusions, thereby facilitating a sense of closure for the panelists and setting 
an expectation for potential future steps. The literature suggests that attempting to 
distribute more than three phases of questionnaires may fatigue participants, potentially 
diminishing both the quality and quantity of results (Sumison, 1998). Though consensus 
was reached on the majority of themes of primary interest, this research may have 
benefitted from an additional phase of queries to solidify consensus on items labeled 
"Special Interest" in Chapter IV. However, time constraints of both the research itself and 
panel members' personal schedules also made this temporally untenable. 
Methodology Summary 
This chapter provided the theoretical basis for gathering and analyzing the 
qualitative data required to explore the use of the hub-and-spoke organizational concept 
in SWA and its potential application  to future contingencies. It discussed the 
appropriateness of Delphi Technique to solicit salient SME opinion on the nuances of 
how hub-and-spoke-organized units were designed and operated in OEF and OIF. 
Analysis and results of this methodology’s effectiveness at meeting research objectives 
are summarized in Chapter Four. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
This chapter summarizes the data obtained by applying the methodology 
previously outlined and analyzing these data accordingly. Four primary areas are 
presented: how the Delphi technique was applied, the associated qualitative results of the 
Phase One questionnaire, the development of the Phase Two questionnaire, and statistical 
results of the follow-up questionnaire. Table 2 summarizes participation levels in each 
phase. It demonstrates that one of the limitations of this study is that it experienced both 
informed and latent attrition. Two of the invited participants from Phase One did not 
make themselves available for the follow-up questionnaire, reducing the total invited 
count by two. One of the panel members who had participated in Phase One simply 
became task saturated in the course of Phase Two and was unable to continue 
participation in the study. 
Table 2. Summary of Participation 
Phase 
# Invited to 
Participate 
# Participated 
Participation Rate 
(%) 
1 11 7 64% 
2 9 6 67% 
  
Overall 
Participation: 
65.5% 
 
Delphi Study Application 
Step One 
The research questions were developed in consultation with the faculty research 
committee with the intent of providing an opportunity to present opinions about the 
operational advantages CE hub-and-spoke units provided in SWA. They further solicited 
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panel member opinion about how which of these advantages may be applicable in other 
AORs and which of them may not. While summarized here,  
Appendix  presents the full questionnaire: 
1) What operational advantages do you perceive hub-and-spoke-organized 
expeditionary CE units offered for meeting theater-level objectives effectively 
in SWA?  
2) For the advantages you would identify as potentially relevant/applicable to 
supporting the CFACC in another AOR, why would they be relevant? 
3) For the advantages you would identify as NOT as potentially 
relevant/applicable to supporting the CFACC in another AOR, why would they 
not be relevant?  
Upon confirmation from a panel of AFIT colleagues that it appeared appropriately clear, 
concise, and effective in soliciting initial panel responses, the initial questionnaire was 
distributed by e-mail to the SME panel. 
Step Two 
Ten duty days were allotted for the Phase One questionnaire to be completed by 
the panel.  Of the questionnaires distributed, seven of eleven were ultimately returned, 
resulting in an 64% response rate. While this return rate was significantly less than 
anticipated, the sample of responsive panel members still represented a high percentage 
of the expected population. The low turnout did not change the underlying assumption 
that only descriptive statistical techniques could be used to present measures of central 
tendency and consensus. Furthermore, the literature review and pilot discussions with 
senior leaders possessing a depth of knowledge with CE hub-and-spoke organizations but 
who were not participating in the study acted as an informal validation data set for SME 
panel member responses. If questionnaire response data deviated significantly from the 
initial data gathered from literature and the others, the low response rate would have been 
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further addressed and an alternate course of research action pursued. Thus, the decision 
was made to proceed as initially planned.  
Step Three 
 The content of the questionnaire responses was analyzed, major themes 
summarized, and the results incorporated into a follow-up Delphi questionnaire. The 
response data suggested that hub-and-spoke-organized CE units can offer three primary 
operational advantages to supported commanders compared to exclusively traditional 
organizational alignments. These advantages appeared to be most closely related to 
providing the supported combatant commander an improved ability to leverage general 
and geospatial engineering capability within the context of the core doctrinal tenets of 
unity of command, flexibility, versatility, and mass effects outlined in AFDD 3-34, 
Engineer Operations. These suggested advantages included enhancements in the 
following. 
1. Command and control effectiveness, defined as effectively ensuring the right 
personnel are doing the right mission tasks fulfilling the requirements that 
most-impact the supported operational mission. 
2. Responsiveness to supported commander, defined as providing a means of 
having appropriate flexibility to shift mass effects of CE capability as required 
to meet mission requirements and ensuring those effects are massed on the 
requirements that will have the greatest effect on the mission. 
3. Combat readiness of assigned personnel, defined as personnel being 
appropriately trained and equipped to prosecute assigned duties/tasks 
effectively. 
The SME responses also suggested various factors, the absence of which would likely have had a 
particularly negative effect on the delivery of the suggested operational advantages. Table 3, Table 
4, and  
Table 5 present the three operational advantages suggested by the responses to Question 
One and associated potential factors for success. The total frequency of responses 
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supporting each suggested advantage is  the sum of individual success factor themes 
associated with each suggested advantage. 
Table 3. Potential Operational Advantage 1 and Supporting Responses 
Advantage Frequency 
Enhanced command and control effectiveness 36 
Factors for Success  
 Ability to 'cross-level' personnel resources within group ensured appropriate 
concentration of mass at the most opportune locations 
6 
Ability to cross-level and tailor manpower, equipment, and material mixes to 
each specific requirement/task 
6 
Clearly communicated and utilized TACON, OPCON, and ADCON relationships 5 
Adhere to centralized control/decentralized execution concept by 
establishing/preserving vital tactical-level relationships while ensuring tactical 
capability is surged in the most effective way to support theater-level operational 
objectives 
4 
Ensure local installation personnel footprint remains lean, facilitating effective 
boots-on-ground (BOG) numbers management - local unit sheds requirement to 
have a large or frequently expanding/contracting permanent party manpower 
numbers to support 
3 
 
Request-for-forces (RFF) personnel are not attached to the original requesting 
unit regardless of whether the need remains for them - reduces the need to 
augment local ECES organization directly with RFF or TDY forces 
2 
Blue-on-Blue ADCON ensures Airman are taken care of in a way that will best 
facilitate future career development 
2 
Maintain lean manpower and process overhead by centralizing core engineering 
functions (ie, planning, programming, design) - eliminates redundancy and 
facilitates more shovel-and-pick operations 
2 
Retain ability to communicate about and maintain accountability for RFF'd 
capabilities - ensures ability to rapidly vet emerging requirements that may 
require a supported unit to submit a RFF by determining if need can be met by 
simply standing up a spoke'd team to address the requirement 
2 
Centralize project tasking and command authority 1 
Ensure support/supported force relationships are delineated (especially to Joint 
partners) - provides a clear organizational context in which to work 
1 
Increased flexibility in personnel waivers due to deeper 'bench' when hub-and-
spoke unit is group-sized 
1 
Ability to communicate observations, innovations, and lessons learned across in-
theater functional community through the use of various update tools - one O-6 
commander improves the chances that lessons learned and other 'news' is 
synthesized and disseminated as appropriate 
1 
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Table 4. Potential Operational Advantage 2 and Supporting Responses 
Advantage Frequency 
Improved responsiveness to supported commander 28 
Factor for Success 
  Effective project prioritization through an 'asset management' approach to 
theater infrastructure requirements 
5 
Efficient materials handling and personnel movement logistics 4 
Theater-wide visibility of requirements and ability to press the supported 
commander for his/her priorities - ensures the right capability is being applied in 
the right way at the right time (or as close to it as possible) 
4 
Theater-wide visibility of requirements and ability to press the supported 
commander for his/her priorities - ensures the right capability is being applied in 
the right way at the right time (or as close to it as possible) 
3 
Smooth interoperability with other higher echelons of agile combat support 
(ACS) functionals (ie, Contracting, Comm, Logistics, Finance, etc) - being a 
theater level asset, rather than a local CE squadron, enhances this potential 
3 
Contracting, finance, and supply personnel organic to the unit - provides another 
option for procurement of Class IV and others, potentially shortening lead times 
when local contracting and civil augmentation program (CAP) contracts are 
overwhelmed or are otherwise experiencing diminished effectiveness 
3 
Standardized/templated design/planning products and tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs) for various core tasks - reduces delivery time, improves 
quality, and boosts safety 
1 
Provide ability to stand up and stand down a capability quickly - reduces 
requirement for local unit to have to vet a need through RFF process 
1 
Hub-managed material yards - provides potentially more expedient 
construction/repair material requirements and movement procurement option, 
reducing the need for local installations to work these issues 
1 
Theater-level visibility of requirements ensures theater-level prioritization of 
support as needed to fulfill strategic/operational objectives 
1 
Reduce wing (or Joint equivalent) level frivolous contention over infrastructure 
requirements and ownership of engineer capability 
1 
Optimized organizational proximity to CFACC air mobility division (AMD) - 
helps prioritize transportation 
1 
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Table 5. Potential Operational Advantage 3 and Supporting Responses 
Advantage Frequency 
Enhanced combat readiness  6 
Factor for Success 
 Train with those with whom personnel will 'fight' 2 
Standardized pre-deployment training and equipping - a unified streamlined 
feedback voice, particularly in Joint training environments, helps focus training 
and equipping efforts on most relevant needs 
2 
Elements of self-sustainment - hub-and-spoke units do not have to rely solely on 
resources procured locally or from supported unit for work, movement, or force 
sustainment requirements 
1 
Some units had physician and religious support team (RST) support - provided 
timely personnel support as needed and ensured focus on mission 
1 
 
Content analysis of the responses to Questions Two and Three suggested that 
there may be general agreement that most of the operational advantages offered by SWA 
hub-and-spoke organized CE units may be replicated in other AORs. However, the 
responses suggested a number of caveats, conditions, and constraints that senior leaders 
and planning staffs should consider when making future CE hub-and-spoke force 
planning and organizational recommendations. Table 6 presents the number of responses 
that suggested that all or most of the operational advantages may be relevant in another 
AOR, along with the caveats, conditions and constraints offered simultaneously. 
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Table 6. Response Summary to Initial Questionnaire, Questions 2 and 3 
Category Frequency 
All operational advantages previously suggested are potentially relevant to hub-
and-spoke-organized CE units supporting the CFACC in another AOR 
6 
Caveats/Conditions/Constraints 13 (total) 
 There is limited evidence for a proof of concept for using hub-and-spoke-
organized CE units in Phase 1/2 combat operations where active beddowns are 
on-going and infrastructure and materials procurement lines are not robust 
2 
The challenge of inter/intra-theater movement (air, ground, or sea-borne) must be 
addressed by planners determining required manning levels and associated 
equipment and materials requirements 
2 
It is critical that consideration be given to siting resources so that extreme 
distances or "islanding" of resources that could provide a means of self-
sustainment, if co-located, is avoided 
2 
Consideration must be made for how the possibility of future coalition 
collaboration situations may affect hub-and-spoke manpower levels, disposition, 
and training requirements - prime power and other support equipment could 
introduce redundancies; falling in on foreign electrical infrastructure may impose 
serious operational constraints 
1 
Must have a pool of 'good' troop labor projects, especially when they are 
standing by to execute more appropriate emergency/surge tasks 
1 
Planners must be aware that the advantage of being able to flex personnel from 
one squadron to another can be tempered when some squadrons are TACON to 
another HHQ within the JTF 
1 
Planners must be aware that the advantage of being able to flex personnel from 
one squadron to another can be tempered when some squadrons are TACON to 
another HHQ within the JTF 
1 
Allowance must be given for loss in procurement effectiveness if policy dictates 
all procurement be accomplished centrally -consideration must be given to 
materials/equipment that can be more effectively/efficiently procured locally 
1 
 Planners should fully consider for boots-on-ground (BOG) constraints as these 
may mitigate some of the potential operational advantages that hub-and-spoke 
organized units may offer 
1 
Air Force corporate culture challenge of local WG/CCs' expectation of owning 
their own robust CE capability (ie, "one base, one boss") must be addressed and 
the impact of no organic physician and/or RST support within a hub-and-spoke-
organized CE group must be fully considered 
1 
 
Some respondents also offered additional comments related to potential future 
innovations of expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke organized units. The implication 
suggested was that CE decision-makers and planning staff personnel should consider 
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these additional recommendations when organizing future CE hub-and-spoke units. Table 
7 summarizes these response data. 
Table 7. Suggested Future Planning Considerations 
Category Frequency 
Hub-and-spoke-organized CE units should be considered for support to 
contingency exercises and exercise-related construction requirements 1 
When hub-and-spoke unit is leveraging both Prime BEEF and RED HORSE 
capabilities, it would be best to ensure the group commander (usually an O-6) 
has had operational RH experience prior to assuming command of the group 
1 
 
To provide formal feedback to the facilitator, participants were asked to review 
this summary and rate their level of agreement on the five-point Likert scale discussed in 
Chapter Three. The scale was as follows: 5=Strongly Agree, 4=Agree, 3=Neutral, 
2=Disagree, 1=Strongly Disagree. Included at Appendix  is the follow-up questionnaire 
distributed to the SME panel upon review and pretest by AFIT colleagues and the 
research committee. 
Step Four 
Thirteen working days were allotted for the Phase Two questionnaire to be 
completed by the panel.  Two of the invited first round panelists were unresponsive so 
they did not receive the follow-up questionnaire. Thus nine follow-up questionnaires 
were distributed, six of which were returned, resulting in a 67% response rate. Despite 
the low response rate, similar rationale to that which was applied in Step Two's decision 
to continue the study applied in Step Four. 
Step Five 
Using the framework outlined in Chapter III, content and statistical analyses were 
conducted on the Phase Two follow-up questionnaire responses. Statistical measures of 
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central tendency were calculated in Microsoft Excel using the median scores and 
histogram representation of each responses to each suggested theme. Table 8 -  
Table 13 summarize these findings, with themes listed in the order in which 
responses were requested. Included at the top of each table are the original directions to 
respondents. 
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Table 8. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question One Response Data 
Questionnaire Directions: Please review and rate your agreement with the following 
operational advantages that respondents perceived hub-and-spoke-organized 
expeditionary CE units offered for meeting theater-level objectives effectively in SWA. 
Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Enhanced command and control 
effectiveness 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Improved responsiveness to supported 
commander 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Strongly Agree 
 
Enhanced combat readiness of assigned 
personnel 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 3.5 
 Overall group sense: Generally agree 
 
 
Question Two featured three sub-parts. The questionnaire noted that for each 
operational advantage suggested by responses to Question One, panel member responses 
indicated the potential for numerous success factors required for the existence of the 
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suggested operational advantages. They were then asked to review and rate the degree to 
which they agreed that the each factor contributed the successful deliver of each 
operational advantage. Table 9, Table 10, Table 11, Table 12, and  
Table 13 summarize the resulting responses. 
Table 9. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 2a Response Data 
Associated operational advantage: Enhanced command and control effectiveness, defined 
as effectively ensuring the right personnel are doing the right mission tasks fulfilling the 
requirements that most-impact the supported operational mission 
Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Empowerment to freely re-appropriate (or 
cross-level) CE resources within the group to 
ensure appropriate concentration of mass at 
the most opportune locations 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Strongly Agree 
 
Ability to cross-level and tailor manpower, 
equipment, and material mixes to each 
specific requirement/task 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Strongly Agree 
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Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Clearly communicated and utilized TACON, 
OPCON, and ADCON relationships 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4.5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Adhere to centralized control-decentralized 
execution concept by establishing/preserving 
vital tactical-level relationships while 
ensuring tactical capability is surged most 
effectively to support theater  operational 
objectives 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Ensure local installation personnel footprint 
remains lean, facilitating effective boots-on-
ground (BOG) numbers management - local 
unit sheds requirement to have frequently 
permanent party manpower to support 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Request-for-forces (RFF) personnel are not 
attached to the original requesting unit 
regardless of whether the need remains for 
them - reduces the need to augment local 
ECES organization directly with RFF or 
TDY forces 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 3 
 Overall group sense: Inconclusive 
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Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Blue-on-Blue ADCON ensures Airman are 
taken care of in a way that will best facilitate 
future career development 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4 
 Overall group sense: Bimodal/Agree 
 
Maintain lean manpower and process 
overhead by centralizing core engineering 
functions - eliminates redundancy and 
facilitates more shovel-and-pick operations 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Retain ability to communicate about and 
maintain accountability for RFF'd 
capabilities - ensures ability to vet 
requirements that may require a supported 
unit to submit a RFF vs  simply standing up a 
spoke'd team to address the requirement 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Centralize project tasking and command 
authority 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
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Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Ensure support/supported force relationships 
are delineated (especially to Joint partners) - 
provides a clear organizational context in 
which to work 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4.5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Increased flexibility in personnel waivers due 
to deeper 'bench' when hub-and-spoke unit is 
group-sized 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Ability to communicate observations, 
innovations, and lessons learned across in-
theater functional community through the use 
of various update tools - one O-6 commander 
improves the chances that lessons learned 
and other 'news' is synthesized and 
disseminated as appropriate 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
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Table 10. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 2b Response Data 
Associated operational advantage: Improved responsiveness to supported commander, defined as 
providing a means of having appropriate flexibility to shift mass effects of CE capability as 
required to meet mission requirements and ensuring those effects are massed on the requirements 
that will have the greatest effect on the mission. 
Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Effective project prioritization through an 
'asset management' approach to theater 
infrastructure requirements 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4.5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Efficient materials handling and personnel 
movement logistics 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4.5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Theater-wide visibility of requirements and 
ability to press the supported commander for 
his/her priorities - ensures the right capability 
is being applied in the right way at the right 
time (or as close to it as possible) 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
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Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Effectively address scope creep - when a 
spoke'd team comes in to address an 
infrastructure requirement,  it is apparent 
they are not a permanent presence that can be 
tasked with additional work without 
appropriate vetting 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Smooth interoperability with other higher 
echelons of agile combat support (ACS) 
functionals (ie, Contracting, Comm, 
Logistics, Finance, etc) - being a theater level 
asset, rather than a local CE squadron, 
enhances this potential 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Contracting, finance, and supply personnel 
organic to the unit - provides another option 
for procurement of Class IV, potentially 
shortening lead times when local contracting 
and CAP) are experiencing diminished 
effectiveness 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Standardized/templated design/planning 
products and tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs) for various core tasks - 
reduces delivery time, improves quality, and 
boosts safety 
effectiveness 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
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Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Provide ability to stand up and stand down a 
capability quickly - reduces requirement for 
local unit to have to vet a need through RFF 
process 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Hub-managed material yards - provides 
potentially more expedient 
construction/repair material requirements and 
movement procurement option, reducing the 
need for local installations to work these 
issues 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Reduce wing (or Joint equivalent) level 
frivolous contention over infrastructure 
requirements and ownership of engineer 
capability 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 3.5 
 Overall group sense: Inconclusive 
 
Optimized organizational proximity to 
CFACC air mobility division (AMD) - helps 
prioritize transportation 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
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Table 11. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 2c Response Data 
Associated operational advantage: Enhanced combat readiness of assigned personnel, defined as 
personnel being appropriately trained and equipped to prosecute assigned duties/tasks effectively 
Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Train with those with whom personnel will 
'fight' 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 3.5 
 Overall group sense: Inconclusive 
 
Standardized pre-deployment training and 
equipping - a unified streamlined feedback 
voice, particularly in Joint training 
environments, helps focus training and 
equipping efforts on most relevant needs 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Elements of self-sustainment - hub-and-
spoke units do not have to rely solely on 
resources procured locally or from supported 
unit for work, movement, or force 
sustainment requirements 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Some units had physician and religious 
support team (RST) support - provided 
timely personnel support as needed and 
ensured focus on mission 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 3 
 Overall group sense: Neutral 
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Table 12. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 3 Response Data 
Questionnaire directions: Responses to Questionnaire #1, Questions 2 and 3 regarding 
applicability of the hub-and-spoke organizational concept in another AOR suggested the 
following themes. Please review and rate your agreement with the following statement about 
operational advantages and subsequent caveats, conditions, and/or constraints that respondents 
suggested may influence CE hub-and-spoke force planning and employment decisions. 
Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
All operational advantages previously 
suggested are potentially relevant to hub-and-
spoke-organized CE units supporting the 
CFACC in another AOR 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
There is limited evidence for a proof of 
concept for using hub-and-spoke-organized 
CE units in Phase 1/2 combat operations 
where active beddowns are on-going and 
infrastructure and materials procurement 
lines are not robust 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 1.5 
 Overall group sense: Disagree 
 
The challenge of inter/intra-theater 
movement (air, ground, or sea-borne) must 
be addressed by planners determining 
required manning levels and associated 
equipment and materials requirements 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4.5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
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Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
It is critical that consideration be given to 
siting resources so that extreme distances or 
"islanding" of resources that could provide a 
means of self-sustainment, if co-located, is 
avoided 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4.5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Consideration must be made for how the 
possibility of future coalition situations may 
affect H/S manpower, disposition, and 
training requirements - support equipment 
could introduce redundancies or falling in on 
foreign infrastructure may impose serious 
operational constraints 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 3.5 
 Overall group sense: Generally agree 
 
Must have a pool of 'good' troop labor 
projects, especially when they are standing 
by to execute more appropriate 
emergency/surge tasks 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Planners must be aware that the advantage of 
being able to flex personnel from one 
squadron to another can be tempered when 
some squadrons are TACON to another HHQ 
within the JTF 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4.5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
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Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Allowance must be given for loss in 
procurement effectiveness if policy dictates 
all procurement be accomplished centrally -
consideration must be given to 
materials/equipment that can be more 
effectively/efficiently procured locally 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
 Planners should fully consider for boots-on-
ground (BOG) constraints as these may 
mitigate some of the potential operational 
advantages that hub-and-spoke organized 
units may offer 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 4 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
Air Force corporate culture challenge of local 
WG/CCs' expectation of owning their own 
robust CE capability (ie, "one base, one 
boss") must be addressed 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
 
The impact of no organic physician and/or 
RST support within a hub-and-spoke-
organized CE group must be more fully 
considered 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 3 
 Overall group sense: Inconclusive 
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Table 13. Follow-up Questionnaire, Question 4 Response Data 
Questionnaire directions: The following are additional responses categorized as potential 
considerations for planning future expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke organized units. Please 
review and rate your agreement with these statements. 
 
Question and Statistical Information Response Distribution 
Hub-and-spoke-organized CE units should be 
considered for support to contingency 
exercises and exercise-related construction 
requirements 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 5 
 Overall group sense: Agree 
 
When hub-and-spoke unit is leveraging both 
Prime BEEF and RED HORSE capabilities, 
it would be best to ensure the group 
commander (usually an O-6) has had 
operational RH experience prior to assuming 
command of the group 
 Number of respondents: 6 
 Median: 1.5 
 Overall group sense: Bimodal/Disagree 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the results of the application of the Delphi technique to the 
problem of determining success factors that influence successful delivery of operational 
advantages offered by hub-and-spoke organized expeditionary CE units. The statistical 
analysis provided a means to measure the degree to which the SME panel agreed or 
disagreed with each theme suggested by responses to the initial questionnaire. SME panel 
member responses suggested three operational advantages and associated critical success 
factors, some of which may require further research to develop operational tools to boost 
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the probability that they may be replicated in the future. However, based on review of the 
discussed measures of central tendency and visual inspection of the response histogram, 
consensus could not be claimed or the panel suggested general disagreement on ten 
themes. These themes and implications of the group's sentiment about them are discussed 
further in Chapter V. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations  
Air Force expeditionary civil engineer (CE) support to contingency operations in 
southwest Asia (SWA) created a unique organizational learning environment related to 
how CE forces can better organize to support geographically separated units in a 
manpower-constrained environment and more effectively command and control those 
organizations and their capabilities in support of future contingency operations. This 
research acquired insights and recommendations into a formative theory on hub-and-
spoke force planning of expeditionary engineers. It did so by utilizing grounded theory 
methods to determine factors required for SWA CE hub-and-spoke units' success and 
caveats, conditions, or constraints force planners may take into account when considering 
the concept's application to future contingencies. CE manpower planners will benefit 
from future research attempting to operationalize the success factors determined by this 
research by further exploring their roots and developing new planning tools to support 
decision-makers. To aid this effort, reviewed in this chapter are the themes upon which 
the panel agreed most strongly, caveats to the research in the form of a limitations 
discussion and special interest theme presentation, and potential future research topics. 
High Consensus Themes 
Twenty themes emerged upon which the group displayed a high degree of 
consensus and agreement as demonstrated by the associated median value of the Likert 
responses and visual inspection of the histograms. These factors represent the essence of 
what made it possible for expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke units in SWA to enhance 
general engineering functional command and control, increase CE capability 
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responsiveness to supported commanders, and ensure the continued combat readiness of 
assigned manpower. In their absence, mission capability would likely have been severely 
degraded. Manpower planners may be well-served if they account for these factors when 
considering future hub-and-spoke CONOPs and associated manpower planning tools. 
Table 14 provides a tabular summary of these themes in rank order of the degree to which 
the expert panel appeared to agree with each theme and relative response dispersion 
demonstrated by the response histogram. Accounts from literature, informal pilot 
discussions with non-participant stakeholders, and qualitative comments included on each 
questionnaire compelled inclusion of some themes in this list that did not necessarily 
achieve the highest possible Likert rating median score among participants. An expanded 
discussion follows the table. 
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Table 14. High Consensus Success Factor Summary 
Median Success Factor 
5 Empowerment to freely re-appropriate (or cross-level) CE resources within the 
group to ensure appropriate concentration of mass at the most opportune locations 
5 Ability to cross-level and tailor manpower, equipment, and material mixes to each 
specific requirement/task 
5 Smooth interoperability with other higher echelons of agile combat support (ACS) 
functionals (ie, Contracting, Comm, Logistics, Finance, etc) 
5 
Adhere to centralized control-decentralized execution concept by 
establishing/preserving vital tactical-level relationships while ensuring tactical 
capability is surged most effectively to support theater  operational objectives 
5 Hub-managed material yards 
5 
Maintain lean manpower and process overhead by centralizing core engineering 
functions  
5 Centralize project tasking and command authority 
5 Theater-wide visibility of requirements and ability to press the supported 
commander for his/her priorities  
5 Provide ability to stand up and stand down a capability quickly 
5 
Effectively address scope creep - when a spoke'd team comes in to address an 
infrastructure requirement,  it is apparent they are not a permanent presence that can 
be tasked with additional work without appropriate vetting 
5 Standardized/templated design/planning products and tactics, techniques and 
procedures (TTPs) for various core tasks 
5 Retain ability to communicate about and maintain accountability for RFF'd 
capabilities 
5 
Having contracting, finance, and supply personnel organic to the unit - provides 
another option for procurement of Class IV and others, potentially shortening lead 
times when local contracting and CAP contracts are overwhelmed or are otherwise 
experiencing diminished effectiveness 
4.5 Clearly communicated and utilized TACON, OPCON, and ADCON relationships 
4.5 Ensure support/supported force relationships are clearly delineated (especially to 
Joint partners)  
4.5 Efficient materials handling and personnel movement logistics 
4.5 Effective project prioritization through an 'asset management' approach to theater 
infrastructure requirements 
4 Increased flexibility in personnel waivers due to deeper 'bench' when hub-and-spoke 
unit is group-sized 
4 Optimized organizational proximity to CFACC air mobility division (AMD) 
4 
Elements of self-sustainment - hub-and-spoke units do not have to rely solely on 
resources procured locally or from supported unit for work, movement, or force 
sustainment requirements 
The supported commanders' enablement of CE hub-and-spoke units to freely re-
appropriate, also referred to as cross-level, CE resources within the hub-and-spoke unit 
appeared to ensure appropriate concentration of engineering capability at the most 
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opportune locations. Furthermore, the panel felt that the ability to cross-level and tailor 
not just manpower, but also equipment and material, mixes to each specific task was also 
critical to the successful delivery of operational advantages to the supported commanders. 
When Prime BEEF teams comprise ECESs aligned in direct support of a single 
installation commander, this cross-leveling is often not possible. When operations are in 
protracted durations of transition between kinetic and sustainment phases, manpower 
requirements at the ECES level can vary widely. The hub-and-spoke organizational 
construct appears to offer a viable solution by being able to temporarily surge personnel 
and then quickly stand them down when the requirement no longer exists. 
Responsiveness is enhanced as a result of eliminating the requirement to go through the 
RFF vetting process every time a new manning requirement emerges. Furthermore, close 
organizational proximity to the CFACC and COCOM staff responsible for vetting RFFs 
made it possible to more effectively advocate for increases and decreases in personnel 
attached to the unit via RFF. Panel member qualitative responses suggested that this 
method of RFF accountability made possible by the CE hub-and-spoke directly addressed 
a perceived breakdown in the Joint RFF process. Thus, the perception was that personnel 
numbers were able to be more sustainably and effectively managed by the CE hub-and-
spoke organization compared to the legacy Prime BEEF organizational alignment. 
Theater-wide visibility of requirements was facilitated by close organizational 
proximity to the supported commander. Project tasking and command authority was 
centralized. This ensured the right capability was being applied in the right way at the 
right time, or as close to it as possible, to support theater-level objectives. However, CE 
units centered at secondary hubs were free to establish and maintain vital tactical-level 
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relationships with supported units, thereby maintaining appropriate situational awareness 
of ongoing and anticipated requirements. 
Particularly in Joint operating environments, clearly communicated and utilized 
TACON, operational control (OPCON), and ADCON relationships are critical to the 
effective employment of CE capability. The advocacy phase preceding CE hub-and-
spoke unit operations in SWA catalyzed necessary discussions regarding TACON, 
OPCON, and ADCON in Joint environments. Aligning and solidifying these 
relationships was a key factor in ensuring CE hub-and-spoke unit effectiveness and will 
likely ensure success of hub-and-spoke-organized CE units operating in support of future 
contingencies. Ensuring effective understanding of these relationships both within the 
hub-and-spoke organization and among the supported commanders - particularly in the 
Joint operational environment - made it possible to more effectively leverage CE 
capabilities. 
Elements of core engineering functions like planning, programming, and design 
were centralized as much as practical to maintain a lean manpower and process overhead. 
This minimized redundancy and facilitated the use of more craftspersons on the front 
lines of repair and construction efforts. Reductions in base master plan and design 
delivery times, improvements in quality, and increases in occupational safety records 
boosts were realized as these products were standardized and templated. Standardized 
tactics, techniques, and procedures were more readily implemented across CE hub-and-
spoke units and readily updated as scenarios unfolded. This agile responsiveness 
translated directly to improved organizational effectiveness. 
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CE hub-and-spoke units streamlined the behind-the-lines tasks associated with 
facilitating work in the field. Organizational and physical proximity at the hubs to other 
ACS functions like contracting, communications, logistics, and finance helped facilitate 
smooth interoperability with these functional communities. Being a theater-level asset 
rather than a local ECES appeared to provide a necessary boost in priority to keep 
resources flowing. The hub-managed materials yards that were subsequently populated 
also acted, in concept, as an effective method of ensuring consistent-as-possible flow of 
materials. This translated directly to efficient materials handling. Personnel movement 
logistics were also facilitated as well as could be expected by the hub-and-spoke units' 
organizational proximity to the theater air mobility division. 
Once teams were dispatched to address identified and vetted infrastructure 
requirements, the hub-and-spoke organization was able to effectively address local scope 
creep. This appeared tenable for two primary reasons. Senior officers stationed at the 
teams' hub(s) enabled appropriate organizational top cover to reprioritize requirements 
offered locally by installation leaders at the locations to which the teams forward 
deployed. Additionally, when a spoke team would arrive to address an infrastructure 
requirement,  it was apparent they were not a permanent presence that could be tasked 
with additional work without appropriate vetting. This kept the teams appropriately 
focused on the mission essential tasks of most interest to the supported theater 
commander. Furthermore, elements of self-sustainment meant forward deployed teams 
did not have to rely solely on resources procured locally or from supported unit for work, 
movement, or force sustainment requirements. 
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In addition to the success factors, the panel appeared to achieve consensus on six 
caveat, condition, or constraint themes. Table 15 summarizes these themes. Responses 
suggested general disagreement with the caveat that limited evidence exists for using 
hub-and-spoke CE units in the phases of large scale operations that are most kinetic. 
Most of those who disagreed offered qualitative comments to characterize their 
sentiment. They noted that, particularly in the heavy construction and repair aspects of 
the CE mission, hub-and-spoke operations provided the closest-to-ideal solution for 
flexibly massing general engineering effects at the most opportune times. They pointed to 
personal experiences in both Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and IRAQI 
FREEDOM (OIF) as further evidence of success. Additional qualitative comments 
pertained to a perceived need to address the corporate Air Force's "one base, one boss" 
culture. 
Table 15. High Consensus Caveat/Condition/Constraint Themes 
Median Caveat/Condition/Constraint Theme 
5 
Air Force corporate culture challenge of local WG/CCs' expectation of 
owning their own robust CE capability (ie, "one base, one boss") must be 
addressed 
5 Must have a pool of 'good' troop labor projects, especially when they are 
standing by to execute more appropriate emergency/surge tasks 
4.5 
The challenge of inter/intra-theater movement (air, ground, or sea-borne) 
must be addressed by planners determining required manning levels and 
associated equipment and materials requirements 
4.5 
Planners must be aware that the advantage of being able to flex personnel 
from one squadron to another can be tempered when some squadrons are 
TACON to another HHQ within the JTF 
4.5 
It is critical that consideration be given to siting resources so that extreme 
distances or "islanding" of resources that could provide a means of self-
sustainment, if co-located, is avoided 
1.5 
There is limited evidence for a proof of concept for using hub-and-spoke-
organized CE units in Phase 1/2 combat operations where active beddowns 
are on-going and infrastructure and materials procurement lines are not robust 
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Special Interest Themes 
Certain themes may be of special interest if additional questionnaires are 
contemplated as a part of a follow-up research effort. This interest may be due to their 
low consensus level, inconclusive response data, or outright rejection by the SME panel 
members. The SME panel did not appear to reach consensus on 11 items, as 
demonstrated by visual inspection of the histograms of Likert scale responses. Panel 
member responses to some themes also suggested only moderate levels of agreement or 
disagreement, suggesting lukewarm acceptance, response bias, or unclear questionnaire 
language. Finally, the panel disagreed with several of the themes suggested by one or 
more qualitative responses to the initial questionnaire. While subsequent questionnaires 
could catalyze consensus one way or the other, they could also serve as confirmation that 
multiple diverging opinions are currently held by CE SMEs. 
The median and histogram of panel member responses suggested only moderate 
agreement with the operational advantage pertaining to the hub-and-spoke organization's 
potential to boost in-theater combat readiness of assigned personnel. An additional phase 
of inquiry may have clarified why this was the case or provided a means for the research 
team to clarify its impressions. Qualitative responses of the disagree and neutral 
responses suggested panel member confusion with how the advantage was 
communicated. They also suggested that qualifiers may have been needed to more 
appropriately narrow its focus. They noted that personnel readiness is primarily the 
responsibility of the MAJCOM to which personnel are permanently assigned. Perhaps 
stronger consensus for this item could have been attained if additional background 
verbiage had been included in the questionnaire. 
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A suggested success factor supporting the enhanced command and control 
operational advantage that received lukewarm support stated that RFF personnel were not 
attached to the original requesting unit regardless of whether the need remained for them, 
thus reducing the need to augment a local traditionally-aligned CE squadron directly with 
RFF or temporary duty (TDY) forces. Qualitative responses to this item suggested that its 
wording may have been unclear to the panelists. Based on qualitative comments provided 
by panelists, it appeared that neutral responses may have shifted towards agree if the 
wording had been clarified in a subsequent follow-up questionnaire. Based on these 
responses, a subsequent questionnaire may have catalyzed consensus in the agree range 
or confirmed the existence of two groups of thought within the panel. 
Another suggested success factor supporting the enhanced command and control 
operational advantage that received subdued support stated that having ADCON aligned 
exclusively through Air Force channels ensures Airman are taken care of in a way that 
will best facilitate future professional military development. Qualitative responses to this 
item suggested that its wording may have been unclear to the panelists. Based on 
qualitative comments provided by panelists, it appeared that neutral responses may have 
shifted towards agree if the wording had been clarified in a subsequent follow-up 
questionnaire. Based on these responses, a subsequent questionnaire may have catalyzed 
consensus in the agree range or confirmed the existence of two groups of thought within 
the panel. 
A suggested success factor supporting the presence of the improved 
responsiveness to supported commander advantage that did not achieve consensus stated 
that this advantage was achieved by reducing wing (or Joint equivalent) level perhaps-
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frivolous tactical level contentions over infrastructure requirements and ownership of 
engineer capability. Panel members did not offer qualifying comments to aid in the 
interpretation of their responses. The response histogram was mound-shaped offset to the 
right of neutral, suggesting a potential slightly agree sentiment. However, half the 
respondents characterized their level of agreement as neutral or disagree. This suggests 
that the disagreements themselves were not resolved at all, that perhaps the presence of 
the CE hub-and-spoke was not the cause of a reduction of this functional dissonance, or 
that the statement itself was altogether unclear.  
Another suggested factor that did not achieve consensus supported the premise 
that CE hub-and-spoke organizations in SWA improved combat readiness of assigned 
members. It stated that this advantage was delivered as a result of personnel training with 
those with whom they would serve in-theater immediately prior to the deployment. Panel 
members offered few qualitative comments to describe their ratings. However, one 
described the disagree rating by stating that the advantage could only be applicable to a 
future hub-and-spoke unit if the state-side squadron deployed its squadron en masse. 
Panelists responding to a follow-up questionnaire with additional clarifying information 
may have achieved consensus on this item. 
A suggested factor that achieved only slightly agree consensus supported the 
premise that CE hub-and-spoke organizations in SWA improved combat readiness of 
assigned members. It stated that this advantage was delivered at least partially as a result 
of having physician and religious support team (RST) support directly attached to some 
hub-and-spoke units. While none of the panelists offered a disagree response, qualitative 
feedback suggested even less support for this factor than the numerical responses 
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indicated. While panelists appeared to support the premise that these support elements 
were certainly useful to those SWA hub-and-spoke CE units that had them, their presence 
was not an integral part of the ongoing or future success of the CE hub-and-spoke units. 
A follow-up questionnaire with additional background information requesting revised 
responses may have strengthened the consensus on this item. 
The panel generally agreed with the condition that consideration should be made 
for how the possibility of situations where there is closer collaboration with coalition 
nation partners for infrastructure needs may affect hub-and-spoke manpower levels, 
disposition, and training requirements. However, a theme emerged from the qualitative 
response that tempered this sentiment. Specifically, it suggested that this situation may be 
present in most future operational contexts and must thus be taken regardless of how CE 
capability is presented. 
Responses suggested that the group maintained no consensus in its sentiment 
about the caveat that the impact of having no organic physician or RST support in the 
latest iteration of the CE hub-and-spoke in SWA must be more fully investigated. Only 
those who disagreed offered qualitative comments to characterize their sentiment. They 
noted that they had specifically not seen this as a limiting factor in their personal 
experience within both the current ECEG and the EPBG before it. Perhaps another 
follow-up questionnaire may have catalyzed a shift in opinion one way or the other 
among those who were neutral on the subject. 
The group appeared to reject the suggested innovation related to ensuring that 
future CE hub-and-spoke group commanders have operational RED HORSE experience 
in their duty history. Most of those who disagreed offered additional strongly-worded 
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qualitative justification. While one third of the group appeared to agree with the 
assertion, they provided no additional justification in support. This does not necessarily 
invalidate their input but having the chance to review their initial responses via another 
follow-up questionnaire may have provided a catalyst to justify or modify their 
responses. 
Implications and Recommendations for Future Research 
Summarized in Chapter II, the historical analysis phase of this research effort 
suffered from gaps in recent data and knowledge that perhaps should have been readily 
available through Air Force or Joint OIL databases. AARs, end of tour reports, and exit 
interviews canvassing the time periods of interest to this research were generally not 
available from previously established sources. Most of those obtained for use by this 
research were via personal contact with either the CE observations, innovations, and 
lessons learned (OIL) primary point of contact or the individuals responsible for their 
generation. Furthermore, even if the applicable theoretical basis for developing tools to 
apply the success factors documented by this research existed, the quantitative data 
required for such analysis are not readily available and conflicting expectations exist 
within the CE operational community about the existence of these data. The Air Force 
CE corporate knowledge management enterprise may benefit from research exploring 
how to more effectively codify applicable expeditionary knowledge and  collect the data 
required to develop tools that help operationalize it. Perhaps simply tracking down 
manpower productivity and AAR data  and populating OIL databases already present 
may be the best alternative. 
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The Air Force Civil Engineer Center's (AFCEC) Readiness Division (CEX) is 
well-positioned within the CE community to continue its record of facilitation of 
expeditionary knowledge transfer by partnering with the Center's renewed research focus. 
The professionals within the CEX expeditionary engineering section act as the SMEs for 
the Prime BEEF and RED HORSE issues within the Air Force and Joint environments. 
They also manage various inputs into war planning documents and act as a focal point for 
deliberate planning, which can benefit from further operational research and subsequent 
development of more quantitative planning tools. Their active input to research agents 
capable of operationalizing the advantages and success factors documented by this 
research is critical. Partnering with military research entities like the Air Force Institute 
of Technology to perform this research can also have the added benefit of facilitating the 
professional military education of company grade officers. While applying the necessary 
analytical rigor to these force planning problems, they also develop CE force planning 
knowledge they can then use to make informed decisions based on perspectives honed by 
exposure to operational doctrine within the context of addressing real world challenges. 
They can be thus better-equipped to act as effective advocates for Air Force CE's support 
to the Air Force and Joint operational communities. 
In the scoping phase of this research, a CE senior leader reiterated one of the 
ultimate force planning goals he maintains for his planning staff. His intent is to 
operationalize the success factors distilled by this project so future hub-and-spoke 
organized CE capabilities can offer the supported commander with operational 
advantages analogous to those offered to the SWA combined forces air component 
commander (CFACC). Two primary areas may be worth considering as future research 
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goals to help operationalize the success factors documented by this research: the 
development of hub-and-spoke manpower optimization tools and geospatial beddown 
siting tools. Their success relies on several factors outlined in the next two sections. 
Development of a Manpower Optimization Tool 
Arguably the research outcome most readily useful to CE force planners may be 
the production of a hub-and-spoke unit manpower sizing tool. A goal programming 
optimization tool may be such a solution since presenting expeditionary CE surge 
capabilities in a hub-and-spoke fashion inherently introduces the possibility of tradeoffs. 
Engineer force planning is a problem of using finite manpower, supplies, and equipment 
to accomplish a seemingly-endless stream of engineer requirements. A wing commander 
may wish to upgrade base facilities to enhance the installation residents’ quality of life or 
posture it for mission expansion later in the campaign but is unable to do so with the 
sustainment CE manpower level the installation is authorized. More generally, in the 
absence of a compulsory draft, it remains necessary to preserve the operations tempo 
(OPSTEMPO) of non-deployed personnel at a sustainable rate. If the maximum number 
of personnel were available for the duration of a campaign, the risk of longer term 
degradation of the CE functional community would become unacceptably high.  For 
these reasons, the problem of creating a hub-and-spoke unit manpower recommendation 
for the supported combatant commander (COCOM) lends itself to having optimization 
analysis applied. 
The possibility of multiple goals for the use of the wide spectrum of CE capability 
can be high. For this reason, it is possible that a new multi-criteria decision making 
(MCDM) tool could be of use to CE force planners. Given the sustainable mission 
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accomplishment objectives stated by senior leadership, the most relevant steps upon 
which to focus in the development of a MCDM tool may be the definition of model 
attributes and determining their objective weights. Proposing values for these may require 
a combination of further qualitative analysis of end-of-tour reports, elicitation of expert 
opinion, and quantitative analysis of productivity levels demonstrated by SWA CE hub-
and-spoke units. Expert opinion may be required to determine the most appropriate 
constraints and objectives and their relative hierarchy. Man-hour productivity data may 
also provide the basis for the weighting or revision of historical, published productivity 
expectations.  
As this research found, little in the way of CE hub-and-spoke unit manpower 
productivity data are readily available for analysis. Addressing this challenge may be the 
first step in the development of a MCDM manning tool. Additionally, consideration may 
need to be given to developing hybrid surrogate measures of CE manpower need and 
exploring the interaction between both the UTC and enduring location approaches. 
Research by Winkler (2011) and others began this exploration  by evaluating recent 
evolutions of bases from austere expeditionary to enduring locations and associated 
impacts on CE manpower requirements. CE hub-and-spoke manpower planning 
effectiveness may be aided by similar analysis of hub-and-spoke manpower requirements 
as tactical infrastructure evolves. Once these data have been captured, more advanced 
statistical techniques than the simple descriptive ones used in this research could be 
applied to determine if official CE instructions should be revised to reflect the labor 
productivity demonstrated by CE hub-and-spoke units in SWA. 
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Another potential approach to developing an optimization model may be offered 
by the transportation and logistics operations research disciplines. Methods of gaining 
and maintaining operational and competitive advantages are continuously sought through 
the study of the hub-and-spoke network concept applied to logistics problems. Of 
particular interest to CE hub-and-spoke organizational planners may be logistics 
researchers' interest in the degree to which selective centralization of given functions 
offers systems-level operational advantages. Research into striking the optimal 
centralization-decentralization balance and finding methods of continuously evaluating 
that balance's ability to make an expeditionary CE organization effective may offer 
valuable insight to Air Force leaders and force planners. Additionally, treating CE 
capability as "packages" to be delivered and leveraged at a destination may yield useful 
perspectives. 
Geospatial Tools 
Developing geospatial tools may assist CE force planners' decision-making with 
regard to the physical disposition of CE hub-and-spoke capabilities. These tools may help 
answer a question like, "What is the optimal hub location for a hub-and-spoke-organized 
CE unit fulfilling expeditionary Air Force infrastructure requirements in a given 
contingency?" To answer this question, the researcher may consider potential variables 
for inclusion in a given CE hub-and-spoke physical disposition recommendation tool, 
assessing both significance of the variables to force disposition decision-making and 
practical aspects of data availability in the time available for the project. Perhaps 
available literature and discussions with SMEs in the CE functional community would 
confirm that analysis of primary variables would facilitate development of a geospatially-
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derived recommendation for CE unit disposition. The researcher could enhance the 
validity of this type of project by eliciting SME opinion on objective weights or variable 
hierarchies for the variables. A preliminary list could include: 
 Size/Length of Runway(s) at candidate airfields 
 Type of aircraft expected to be utilized for routine mission-related 
transportation 
 Range of those expected aircraft 
 Relative location of candidate airfields to each other 
 Relative location of candidate airfields to seaports 
 Land area under coalition control in given phases of a major 
campaign/conflict 
 Average annual precipitation at candidate beddown sites 
Conclusion 
This research offered insight into a formative theory on hub-and-spoke force 
planning for expeditionary engineers by documenting concepts and operational 
experiences previously held as tacit knowledge by SMEs. It documented factors that 
influenced the successful delivery of operational advantages offered by hub-and-spoke 
organized expeditionary CE units in SWA and made an initial determination about their 
applicability to CE hub-and-spoke units supporting future contingencies. It did so by first 
conducting an historical analysis of published CE history, manpower planning guidance, 
AARs, and the methods available to elicit SME knowledge in an effort to address 
published knowledge gaps. It then utilized a modified Delphi technique to elicit SME 
opinion about the operational advantages CE hub-and-spoke units offered to supported 
commanders in SWA and the factors that led to their successful delivery. It concluded by 
offering perspective on the findings' implications and recommendations for future 
research. 
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Appendix A. Delphi Study Phase One 
CE Hub-and-spoke Delphi Study Questionnaire #1 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this Delphi Study.  The purpose of this study is to perform 
research relating to AF civil engineer capability presentation in the PACAF AOR. The objective is to 
determine how operational advantages like those realized in southwest Asia when expeditionary CE 
capability was organized in a hub-and-spoke fashion may be replicated in PACAF. The sponsor for this 
research is Colonel Karl Bosworth, PACAF/A7, Joint Base Hickam-Pearl, HI.   
 
Please note the following:  
Benefits and risks:  There are no personal benefits or risks for participating in this study. Your participation 
in completing this questionnaire should take 30-45 minutes per round.  
 
Confidentiality:  Your responses are completely confidential, and your identity will remain anonymous.  
No individual data will be reported; only data in aggregate will be made public.  Data will be kept in a 
secure, locked cabinet to which only the researchers will have access.  If you have any questions or 
concerns about your participation in this study, please contact:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary consent:  Your participation is completely voluntary.  You have the right to decline to answer 
any question, to refuse to participate, or to withdraw at any time.  Your decision of whether or not to 
participate will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  Completion 
of the questionnaire implies your consent to participate. 
 
Background:  
Contingency Air Force civil engineer (CE) capabilities have come to be presented to combatant 
commanders primarily in the form of Prime BEEF and RED HORSE teams. While these units have 
traditionally been controlled by various levels of an often-sprawling command structure, local wing 
commanders have developed a reasonable expectation that at least one Prime BEEF team will be assigned 
to a particular installation and controlled by that wing commander for the purpose of operating and 
maintaining local base infrastructure. And that RED HORSE resources will be commanded and controlled 
by the command echelon above wing. Most recently, the Expeditionary Prime BEEF Group (EPBG), 
Expeditionary RED HORSE Group (ERHG), and Expeditionary Civil Engineer Group (ECEG) have been 
utilized in the AFCENT AOR. These units use(d) a hub-and-spoke concept of operation to support 
infrastructure project programming, design, troop construction, and contract construction management 
requirements generated by SWA contingency operations. They have been aligned at the command echelon 
above wing (or Joint equivalent), typically as part of a Joint task force. Anecdotal data and those found in 
available end of tour reports suggest that this alignment, featuring traditional Prime BEEF capabilities and 
the heavy repair/construction capabilities of RED HORSE under one command element, has made it 
possible to better manage the utilization of expeditionary CE capability in the AFCENT AOR by enabling 
functional commanders to allocate often-limited CE resources to the areas where these resources will have 
the greatest impact on the mission. 
 This research effort is sponsored by the office of the PACAF/A7, who is seeking to ultimately 
develop a CE force planning model that captures operational advantages SWA hub-and-spoke-organized 
CE units have given to supported operations. Developing this model requires the distilling and codifying 
force planning knowledge developed in the course of applying the hub-and-spoke organizational model to 
CE units operating in OIF, OEF, and OND and applying appropriate facets of that knowledge to future 
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operations plans in other AORs. Currently, only an ad hoc hub-and-spoke manpower model exists; it is 
limited in its ability to reflect human resources requirements for constructing, repairing, and maintaining 
expeditionary airfields. NOTE: This study is undertaken with the assumption that expeditionary CE 
capability will be used primarily in direct support of the combined force air component commander 
(CFACC), with support to Joint infrastructure requirements provided by exception. 
By responding, you have the opportunity to shape how the AF CE functional community takes 
advantage of lessons learned as a result of hub-and-spoke organizational innovations.. Thank you for 
participating in this study and helping apply those lessons and the perspective you have honed through 
years of CE service will to the next contingency. I appreciate your time and candid responses. 
Process: 
1.  Please complete this questionnaire electronically and return it to:  joshua.hager@afit.edu no later than 
12 December 2012.  If you have questions, I can be reached at that e-mail or at DSN:.317-785-3636  
 
2.  This questionnaire is an instrument of a Delphi study.  The Delphi method is an iterative, group 
communication process which is used to collect and distill the judgments of experts using a series of 
questionnaires interspersed with feedback.  The questionnaires are designed to focus on problems, 
opportunities, solutions, or forecasts.  Each questionnaire is developed based on the results of the previous 
questionnaire.  The process continues until the research question is answered.  For example, when 
consensus is reached, sufficient information has been exchanged.  This usually takes, on average, 3-4 
rounds. 
 
3.  There are three primary questions for this round.  The survey is non-attribution, so please elaborate 
fully on your answers and feel free to provide additional insight, if you deem it relevant, even if it is not 
specifically requested by the questions.  Once all interview responses are received and analyzed, you will 
be asked to review and revise your initial responses based on responses provided by the entire group.  
Subsequent rounds will be announced as needed and all research is scheduled to conclude by 6 February 
2012.   
 
Research questions: 
Please answer the following questions as clearly and concisely as possible without omitting critical 
information or rationale required for the group to consider your opinions.  Base your responses on 
your own personal experiences and perceptions. 
 
1. What operational advantages do you perceive hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE units offered 
for meeting theater-level objectives effectively in SWA?  
2. For the advantages you would identify as potentially relevant/applicable to supporting the CFACC in 
another AOR, why would they be relevant? 
3. For the advantages you would identify as NOT as potentially relevant/applicable to supporting the 
CFACC in another AOR, why would they not be relevant? 
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Appendix B. Delphi Study Phase Two 
CE Hub-and-spoke Delphi Study Follow-up 
 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this Delphi Study.  The purpose of this study is to perform 
research relating to AF civil engineer capability presentation in the PACAF AOR. The objective is to 
determine how operational advantages like those realized in southwest Asia when expeditionary CE 
capability was organized in a hub-and-spoke fashion may be replicated in future contingencies. The 
sponsor for this research is Colonel Karl Bosworth, PACAF/A7, Joint Base Hickam-Pearl, HI.   
 
Please note the following:  
Benefits and risks:  There are no personal benefits or risks for participating in this study. Your participation 
in completing this questionnaire should take 15-20 minutes.  
 
Confidentiality:  Your responses are completely confidential, and your identity will remain anonymous.  
No individual data will be reported; only data in aggregate will be made public.  Data will be kept in a 
secure, locked cabinet to which only the researchers will have access.  If you have any questions or 
concerns about your participation in this study, please contact:   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Voluntary consent:  Your participation is completely voluntary.  You have the right to decline to answer 
any question, to refuse to participate, or to withdraw at any time.  Your decision of whether or not to 
participate will not result in any penalty or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  Completion 
of the questionnaire implies your consent to participate. 
 
Background:  
Your responses to the first round questionnaire spoke directly to the operational advantages that 
hub-and-spoke-organized CE units can offer to supported commanders. The question prompts were: 
1) What operational advantages do you perceive hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE units 
offered for meeting theater-level objectives effectively in SWA?  
2) For the advantages you would identify as potentially relevant/applicable to supporting the 
CFACC in another AOR, why would they be relevant? 
3) For the advantages you would identify as NOT as potentially relevant/applicable to supporting 
the CFACC in another AOR, why would they not be relevant? 
The content of the responses was subsequently analyzed and major themes summarized. The 
response data suggest that hub-and-spoke-organized CE units can offer three primary operational 
advantages to supported commanders compared to legacy organizational alignment(s). These advantages 
appear to be most closely related to providing the supported combatant commander an improved ability to 
leverage general and geospatial engineering capability within the context of the core doctrinal tenets of 
unity of command, flexibility, versatility, and mass effects outlined in AFDD 3-34 Engineer Operations. 
These suggested advantages include enhancements in: 
1) Command and control effectiveness , defined as effectively ensuring the right personnel are 
doing the right mission tasks fulfilling the requirements that most-impact the supported 
operational mission 
2) Responsiveness to supported commander, defined as providing a means of having appropriate 
flexibility to shift mass effects of CE capability as required to meet mission requirements 
and ensuring those effects are massed on the requirements that will have the greatest 
effect on the mission. 
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3) Combat readiness of assigned personnel, defined as personnel being appropriately trained and 
equipped to prosecute assigned duties/tasks effectively  
SME responses also suggest key factors, the absence of which would likely have had a particularly 
negative effect on the delivery of the suggested operational advantages. In addition, responses suggest a 
number of caveats, conditions, and/or constraints that senior leaders and planning staffs should consider 
when making future CE hub-and-spoke force planning and organizational recommendations. Finally, 
additional considerations were suggested for subsequent planning efforts. The following pages will guide 
your review of these suggested themes by presenting them systematically and requesting your evaluation in 
turn. I appreciate your time and candid responses. 
Process: 
1.  The Delphi method is an iterative, group communication process used to elicit your expert opinion using 
a series of questionnaires interspersed with feedback.  Questionnaires are designed to focus on problems, 
opportunities, solutions, or forecasts.  Each follow-up questionnaire is developed based on the results of the 
previous questionnaire.  The process continues until the research question is answered. This takes, on 
average, 3-4 rounds. 
 
2.  This follow-up questionnaire represents the second round of this study. Once all responses are received 
and analyzed, you may be asked to review and revise your initial responses based on those provided by the 
entire group. It is non-attribution, so please elaborate fully on any qualitative comments you feel are 
necessary and feel free to provide additional insight, if you deem it relevant, even if it is not specifically 
requested by the questions.  Subsequent rounds will be announced as needed and all research is scheduled 
to conclude by 6 February 2012.  
 
3.  Please complete this questionnaire electronically and return it to:  joshua.hager@afit.edu no later than 
21 January 2013.  If you have questions, I can be reached at that e-mail or at DSN: 317-785-3636. 
 
Directions: 
Using the 5-point Likert Scale presented below, please rate your agreement with the themes suggested by 
the group's answers to the original research questions summarized in Background. Feel free to provide 
additional qualitative responses to any of the FOUR (4) questions, communicating as clearly and concisely 
as possible without omitting critical information or rationale required for the group to consider your 
opinions.  Base your responses on your own personal experiences and perceptions. 
 
Rating Scale: 
5 - Strongly Agree 
4 - Agree 
3 - Neutral 
2 - Disagree 
1 - Strongly Disagree 
 
 
 
1. Please review and rate your agreement with the following operational advantages that respondents 
perceived hub-and-spoke-organized expeditionary CE units offered for meeting theater-level objectives 
effectively in SWA. 
Advantage Rating Comments 
Enhanced command and control effectiveness   
Improved responsiveness to supported commander   
Enhanced combat readiness of assigned personnel   
 
Additional comments (if necessary): 
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2. For each operational advantage identified in Questionnaire #1, Question 1, panel member responses 
suggested the potential for numerous factors required for delivery of the suggested operational advantages. 
Please review and rate the degree to which you agree with the following factors for success suggested for 
each operational advantage provided by hub-and-spoke-organized CE units specifically. 
 
a) Enhanced command and control effectiveness , defined as effectively ensuring the right personnel are 
doing the right mission tasks fulfilling the requirements that most-impact the supported operational mission 
Factors for Success Rating Comments 
Empowerment to freely re-appropriate (or cross-level) 
CE resources within the group to ensure appropriate 
concentration of mass at the most opportune locations 
  
Ability to cross-level and tailor manpower, equipment, 
and material mixes to each specific requirement/task 
  
Clearly communicated and utilized TACON, OPCON, 
and ADCON relationships 
  
Adhere to centralized control/decentralized execution 
concept by establishing/preserving vital tactical-level 
relationships while ensuring tactical capability is 
surged in the most effective way to support theater-
level operational objectives 
  
Ensure local installation personnel footprint remains 
lean, facilitating effective boots-on-ground (BOG) 
numbers management - local unit sheds requirement 
to have a large or frequently expanding/contracting 
permanent party manpower numbers to support 
  
Request-for-forces (RFF) personnel are not attached to 
the original requesting unit regardless of whether the 
need remains for them - reduces the need to augment 
local ECES organization directly with RFF or TDY 
forces 
  
Blue-on-Blue ADCON ensures Airman are taken care 
of in a way that will best facilitate future career 
development 
  
Maintain lean manpower and process overhead by 
centralizing core engineering functions (ie, planning, 
programming, design) - eliminates redundancy and 
facilitates more shovel-and-pick operations 
  
Retain ability to communicate about and maintain 
accountability for RFF'd capabilities - ensures ability 
to rapidly vet emerging requirements that may require 
a supported unit to submit a RFF by determining if 
need can be met by simply standing up a spoke'd team 
to address the requirement 
  
Centralize project tasking and command authority   
Ensure support/supported force relationships are 
delineated (especially to Joint partners) - provides a 
clear organizational context in which to work 
  
Increased flexibility in personnel waivers due to 
deeper 'bench' when hub-and-spoke unit is group-
sized 
  
Ability to communicate observations, innovations, and 
lessons learned across in-theater functional 
community through the use of various update tools - 
one O-6 commander improves the chances that 
  
 90 
lessons learned and other 'news' is synthesized and 
disseminated as appropriate 
 
b) Improved responsiveness to supported commander, defined as providing a means of having appropriate 
flexibility to shift mass effects of CE capability as required to meet mission requirements and ensuring 
those effects are massed on the requirements that will have the greatest effect on the mission. 
Factors for Success Rating Comments 
Effective project prioritization through an 'asset management' 
approach to theater infrastructure requirements 
  
Efficient materials handling and personnel movement logistics   
Theater-wide visibility of requirements and ability to press the 
supported commander for his/her priorities - ensures the right 
capability is being applied in the right way at the right time (or 
as close to it as possible) 
  
Effectively address scope creep - when a spoke'd team comes 
in to address an infrastructure requirement,  it is apparent they 
are not a permanent presence that can be tasked with 
additional work without appropriate vetting 
  
Smooth interoperability with other higher echelons of agile 
combat support (ACS) functionals (ie, Contracting, Comm, 
Logistics, Finance, etc) - being a theater level asset, rather 
than a local CE squadron, enhances this potential 
  
Contracting, finance, and supply personnel organic to the unit 
- provides another option for procurement of Class IV and 
others, potentially shortening lead times when local 
contracting and civil augmentation program (CAP) contracts 
are overwhelmed or are otherwise experiencing diminished 
effectiveness 
  
Standardized/templated design/planning products and tactics, 
techniques and procedures (TTPs) for various core tasks - 
reduces delivery time, improves quality, and boosts safety 
  
Provide ability to stand up and stand down a capability 
quickly - reduces requirement for local unit to have to vet a 
need through RFF process 
  
Hub-managed material yards - provides potentially more 
expedient construction/repair material requirements and 
movement procurement option, reducing the need for local 
installations to work these issues 
  
Reduce wing (or Joint equivalent) level frivolous contention 
over infrastructure requirements and ownership of engineer 
capability 
  
 Optimized organizational proximity to CFACC air mobility 
division (AMD) - helps prioritize transportation 
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c) Enhanced combat readiness of assigned personnel, defined as personnel being appropriately trained and 
equipped to prosecute assigned duties/tasks effectively 
Factors for Success Rating Comments 
Train with those with whom personnel will 'fight'   
Standardized pre-deployment training and equipping 
- a unified streamlined feedback voice, particularly in 
Joint training environments, helps focus training and 
equipping efforts on most relevant needs 
  
Elements of self-sustainment - hub-and-spoke units 
do not have to rely solely on resources procured 
locally or from supported unit for work, movement, 
or force sustainment requirements 
  
Some units had physician and religious support team 
(RST) support - provided timely personnel support as 
needed and ensured focus on mission 
  
 
Additional comments (if necessary): 
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3. Responses to Questionnaire #1, Questions 2 and 3 regarding applicability of the hub-and-spoke 
organizational concept in another AOR suggested the following themes. Please review and rate your 
agreement with the following statement about operational advantages and subsequent caveats, conditions, 
and/or constraints that respondents suggested may influence CE hub-and-spoke force planning and 
employment decisions. 
Category Rating Comments 
All operational advantages previously 
suggested are potentially relevant to hub-and-
spoke-organized CE units supporting the 
CFACC in another AOR 
  
Caveats/Conditions/Constraints  
There is limited evidence for a proof of concept 
for using hub-and-spoke-organized CE units in 
Phase 1/2 combat operations where active 
beddowns are on-going and infrastructure and 
materials procurement lines are not robust 
  
The challenge of inter/intra-theater movement 
(air, ground, or sea-borne) must be addressed by 
planners determining required manning levels and 
associated equipment and materials requirements 
  
It is critical that consideration be given to siting 
resources so that extreme distances or "islanding" 
of resources that could provide a means of self-
sustainment, if co-located, is avoided 
  
Consideration must be made for how the 
possibility of future coalition collaboration 
situations may affect hub-and-spoke manpower 
levels, disposition, and training requirements - 
prime power and other support equipment could 
introduce redundancies; falling in on foreign 
electrical infrastructure may impose serious 
operational constraints 
  
Must have a pool of 'good' troop labor projects, 
especially when they are standing by to execute 
more appropriate emergency/surge tasks 
  
Planners must be aware that the advantage of 
being able to flex personnel from one squadron to 
another can be tempered when some squadrons 
are TACON to another HHQ within the JTF 
  
Allowance must be given for loss in procurement 
effectiveness if policy dictates all procurement be 
accomplished centrally -consideration must be 
given to materials/equipment that can be more 
effectively/efficiently procured locally 
  
 Planners should fully consider for boots-on-
ground (BOG) constraints as these may mitigate 
some of the potential operational advantages that 
hub-and-spoke organized units may offer 
  
Air Force corporate culture challenge of local 
WG/CCs' expectation of owning their own robust 
CE capability (ie, "one base, one boss") must be 
addressed 
  
The impact of no organic physician and/or RST 
support within a hub-and-spoke-organized CE 
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group must be more fully considered 
 
Additional comments (if necessary): 
 
 
4. The following are additional responses categorized as potential considerations for planning future 
expeditionary CE hub-and-spoke organized units. Please review and rate your agreement with these 
statements. 
Future Considerations Rating Comments 
Hub-and-spoke-organized CE units should be 
considered for support to contingency exercises and 
exercise-related construction requirements 
 
 
When hub-and-spoke unit is leveraging both Prime 
BEEF and RED HORSE capabilities, it would be 
best to ensure the group commander (usually an O-6) 
has had operational RH experience prior to assuming 
command of the group 
 
 
 
Additional comments (if necessary): 
  
 94 
Appendix C. AFIT Human Subjects Exemption Approval (Phase One) 
 
 
 
• 
' 
, 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO 
MEMORANDUM FOR OR. TA Y W. JOHANNES 
FROM: JciTrey A. O~tdcn, Ph.D. 
A FIT IRB Research Reviewer 
2950 Hobson Way 
Wright-Pancrson AFB, OH 45433-7765 
19 Nov 2012 
SUBJECT: Approval for exemption request !'rom human experimentation requirements (32 CFR 
219, DoDO 3216.2 and AFJ 40-402) lbr PACAF CE Hub and Spoke. 
I. Your request was based on the Code of Federal Regulmions, title 32. part 219, section 101, 
paragraph (b) (2) Research activities that involve the usc of educational tests (cognitive, 
diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of 
public behavior unless: (i) Information obtained is recorded in such a manner that human 
subjects can be identilie<L directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (i i) Any 
disclosure of the human subjects' responses outside the research could reasonably place the 
snhjects at ri sk of criminal or civil liabili ty or be damaging to the subjects' financial standing, 
employability, or reputation. 
2. Your s tudy quali fies for this exemption because you arc not collecting sensitive data, which 
could reasonably damage the subjects' tlnancia l standing, employabil ity, or reputation. Further, 
you are not collecting any demographic data which could realistically be expected to map a 
given response to a specific subject. 
3. ·n1is detennination pertains only to the Federal , Department ofDc(cnse, and Ai r Force 
regulations that govern the use of human subjects in research. Further, if a subject's future 
response reasonably places them at risk of criminal or civil liabili ty or is damaging to their 
linancial standing, employability. or reputation, you arc required to file an adverse event report 
with this office immediately. ~ 
JI!P 
AFI 
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Appendix D. AFIT Human Subjects Exemption Approval (Phase Two) 
 
  
DEPARTMENT OF T HE AIR FORCE 
AIR FORCE INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO 
MEMORANDUM FOR LT COL TA Y JOHANNES 
FROM: Williant A. Cunningham, Ph.D. 
AFIT IRB Research Reviewer 
2950 Hobson Way 
Wright-PattersonAFB, OH 45433-7765 
25 January 2013 
SUBJECT: Approval for exemption request from hurnan experimentation requirentents (32 CFR 
219, DoDD 3216.2 and AFI 40-402) for student research PACAF CE Hub and Spoke. 
1. Your request was based on the Code of Federal Regulations, title 32, part 219, section 101, 
paragraph (b) (2) ResearCh activities that involve tlle use of educational tests (cognitive, 
diagnostic, aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures, or observation of 
public behavior unless: (i) Infomtation obtained is recorded in such a manner that hurnan 
subjects can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) Any 
disclosure of the human subjects ' responses outside the research could reasonably place the 
subjects at risk of crinlinal or civil liability or be dantaging to the subjects' financial standing, 
employability, or reputation. 
2 . Your study qualifies for this exemption because you are not collecting sensitive data, which 
cotdd reasonably damage the subjects ' financial standing, entployability, or reputation. Further, 
the demographic data you are collecting and the way that you plan to report it cannot realistically 
be expected to map a given response to a specific subject. 
3. This detemlination pertains only to the Federal, Department of Defense, and Air Force 
regulations that govern the use of human subjects in research. Further, if a subject's fttture 
response reasonably places them at risk of crinlinal or civil liability or is damaging to their 
finmcial standing, employability, or reputation, you are required to file an adverse event report 
wilh this office inlmediately. 
//signedf/ 
WILLIAM A. CUNNINGHAM, PH.D. 
AFIT Research Reviewer 
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